



AND THE SEGREGATION DECISIONt
Alexander M. Bickel *
B EFORE setting out on the direct and noble march to the
Court's conclusion in the Segregation Cases,' Chief Jus-
tice Warren took care to post a rear guard. The history of the
adoption of the fourteenth amendment, to which reargument in
these cases had been largely addressed, though casting some light,
was, the Chief Justice said, "inconclusive" at best. "The most
avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly in-
tended them to remove all legal distinctions among 'all persons
born or naturalized in the United States.' Their opponents, just as
certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of
the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect.
What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind
cannot be determined with any degree of certainty." 2 Three
pages later, as befits a commander in mid-advance, the Chief Jus-
tice, having made his dispositions, had no further thought for the
rear: "In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock
back to i868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to i896
when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public
education in the light of its full development and its present place
in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it
I The writer was one of two law clerks to Mr. Justice Frankfurter during the
October Term, 1952. At that term, the Court heard the first argument in the
Segregation Cases and handed down the order for reargument; the cases were re-
argued and decided at the following term. The writer's interest in pursuing an
investigation into the original understanding of the fourteenth amendment was
prompted by the events which took place during his service at the Court.
* Research Associate in Law, Harvard Law School. B.S., C.C.N.Y., 1947;
LL.B., Harvard, 1949.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Id. at 489.
VOLUME 69 NUMBER 1
HeinOnline  -- 69 Harv. L. Rev.  1 1955-1956
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these
plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws." s
The Segregation Cases were extensively briefed and argued at
two terms of Court. Their importance, judged by every criterion
relevant to the Court's work, is difficult to overestimate, and it
is perfectly plain that the Court itself did not underestimate it.
Yet the cases were disposed of in the end by a relatively brief
opinion which hit only the high spots of issues necessarily in-
volved.' The Court knew, of course, that its judgment would
have an unparalleled impact on the daily lives of a very substan-
tial portion of the population, and that the response of many of
those affected would be in varying degrees hostile. It was neces-
sary, therefore, if ever it had been, to exert to the utmost the
prestige, the oracular authority of the institution. To this end, it
was desirable that the Court speak unanimously, with one voice
from the deep. And the less said, the less chance of internal dis-
agreement. By the same token, it was wise to present as small
a target as possible to marksmen on the outside. In sum, with-
out imputing to the Court aspirations to a form of art it does not
profess to practice, one may be entitled to surmise that here was
a decision which, like a poem, "should not mean / But be," and
that the Court saw this and acted on it. Considerations of this
order, applicable only to so extraordinary a case, are sufficient,
in any event, to explain the brevity of the reference to the his-
tory of the fourteenth amendment's adoption and the briskness of
the transition from an apparent assumption of that history's rele-
vance to the statement that the clock cannot be turned back.
Beneath the brevity and beneath the briskness lies the pervasive
problem of the weight to be accorded in constitutional adjudica-
tions to evidence of the framers' original understanding.5 Reliance
on such evidence is subject to caveats applicable to the use of
legislative history as an aid in statutory construction.6 What is
3 id. at 492-93.
4 The Court's deliberate approach to these cases, clearly reflecting its awareness
of their unique importance, is indicated in Sacks, Foreword to The Supreme Court,
1953 Term, 68 HARv. L. REV. 96 (1994). For a survey of some of the issues neces-
sarily involved, see Leflar & Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools -953, 67
HAxv. L. Rav. 377 (i954). This article was published in January, some four months
before the decision came down.
5 See tenBroek, Admissibility and Use by the United States Supreme Court of
Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction, 26 CAlir. L. REv. 287, 437, 664
(1938), 27 CAI.Fw. L. REv. 157, 399 (1939).
6 See Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REv. 407
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more important, it may raise a fundamental question concern-
ing the Court's function in construing the Constitution. This
difficulty is best posed by quotation of two extreme judicial utter-
ances, both advocating meticulous adherence to original intent,
so-called:
i. No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion
or feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized na-
tions of Europe or in this country, should induce the court to give
to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their
favor than they were intended to bear when the instrument was
framed and adopted. Such an argument would be altogether in-
admissible in any tribunal called on to interpret it. If any of its
provisions are deemed unjust, there is a mode prescribed in the
instrument itself by which it may be amended; but while it re-
mains unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood
at the time of its adoption. . . Any other rule of construction
would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it
the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day.
2. The whole aim of construction, as applied to a provision of the
Constitution, is to discover the meaning, to ascertain and give
effect to the intent, of its framers and the people who adopted it.
. . . As nearly as possible we should place ourselves in the condi-
tion of those who framed and adopted it.
Of course, such views, when they prevail, threaten disaster to
government under a written constitution. No further proof need
be adduced than that the first quotation- could anything con-
trast more strikingly with the opinion of the Court in the Segre-
gation Cases? - comes from the judgment of Chief Justice Taney
in Dred Scott v. Sandford,7 and the second from Mr. justice Suth-
erland's dissent in 1934 in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell.8
But it is a long way from rejection of the Taney-Sutherland doc-
trine to the proposition that the original understanding is sim-
ply not relevant.' For arguments based on that understanding
(ig5o),; Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLum. L.
RaV. 527, 543 (1947)-
6o U.S. (X9 How.) 393, 426 (1856).
290 U.S. 398, 453 (1934).
o Chief justice Hughes, for the majority in the Blaisdell case, made his rejec-
tion quite explicit: "If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the
time of its adoption it means to-day, it is intended to say that the great clauses of
the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the
conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them, the statement
1955]
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have a strong pull. They have decided cases for judges who held
the views represented by the passages quoted.'0 But the Court
has also employed them without intentionally connoting, indeed
while disavowing, such views." And they have been relied on by
judges well aware that it was a constitution they were ex-
pounding. 2
The original understanding forms the starting link in the chain
carries its own refutation. It was to guard against such a narrow conception that
Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning - 'we must never forget
that it is a constitution we are expounding' (McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, 407) . . . ." 290 U.S. at 442-43.
10 See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (i935). This opinion, delivered
over the dissent of Justice Stone in which Chief Justice Hughes and Justices
Brandeis and Cardozo joined, was -by Justice Sutherland. But the view expressed
in this case and in the passages quoted in the text is very strong medicine, indeed,
and truly steadfast adherence to it is more than can be asked of any judge. See
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (opinion by Justice
Sutherland).
"I See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Clawans, 3oo U.S. 617 (1937). See also
United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 237 (1933); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87
(1925).
2 In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (i91o), the Court, per Justice
McKenna, held that a punishment consisting of a fine plus lengthy imprisonment
imposed under a Philippine statute for corruptly making false entries in public
records was cruel and unusual within the meaning of the eighth amendment and
hence also within the meaning of the Philippine Bill of Rights. Dealing with the
argument that the Court was applying the eighth amendment in circumstances in
which its framers might not have thought it applicable, Justice McKenna said, in
a frequently quoted passage: "Time works changes, brings into existence new condi-
tions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth." 217 U.S. at 373. Justice White
dissented. He noted that local conditions might well have made appropriate the
severity of this punishment. Then he proceeded at length to demonstrate that the
original understanding of the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" was grounded
in the excesses of the Stuart reigns and was restricted to inhuman bodily punish-
ments and arbitrary imprisonment without sanction of statute. Justice White argued
that the original understanding should not be departed from. In this opinion he'
was joined by Justice Holmes. 217 U.S. at 382, 413.
In National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949), Justice
Frankfurter, in dissent, took a distinction between "great concepts" such as "Com-
merce ... among the several States," "due process of law," "liberty," and "prop-
erty," which, he said, "were purposely left to gather meaning from experience," and
"explicit and specific" terms, such as the word "State" when used in article III in the
grant of the diversity jurisdiction. That word, he stated, is governed by the original
understanding and cannot be broadened to include the District of Columbia. 337
U.S. at 646. (Justice Reed joined in Justice Frankfurter's dissent. Chief Justice
Vinson and Justice Douglas, dissenting separately, also agreed with this view. So did
Justices Jackson, Black, and Burton of the majority, though they were of the opin-
ion that Congress could, under its article I power, create federal jurisdiction in suits
between a citizen of the District of Columbia and a citizen of one of the states.)
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of continuity which is a source of the Court's authority, and it is
not unnatural that appeals to it should recur as consistently as
they do.1- Happily, finding the original understanding, like apply-
ing the Constitution itself, is, at best, "not a mechanical exercise
but a function of statecraft" and of historical insight. 4 And what
"3 This is especially true as regards the fourteenth amendment. In Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U.S. 58i, 601-02 (igoo), counsel, taking as his text the speech by Senator
Jacob Howard of Michigan which opened debate on the fourteenth amendment in
the Senate, CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., ist Sess. 2764-65 (1866), see note 98 infra,
argued that the amendment made the entire Bill of Rights applicable to the states.
Proceeding from Howard's speech without more, the argument is plausible. The
Court dealt with it on the basis of the plain meaning rule and a general proposi-
tion to the effect that historical materials such as debates are always ambiguous
and of dubious value. Twice subsequently the same argument was rejected, though
without examination of historical materials. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(xgo8); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (i937). But Justice Black, speaking
for a four-man minority, returned to the fray in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 70 (1947). Finally, Professor Fairman demonstrated that the argument was
based on a misreading and an incomplete reading of the original understanding.
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN.
L. R~v. 5 (1949).
Perhaps the most famous appeal to the fourteenth amendment's history came
in the course of Roscoe Conkling's devious argument in San Mateo County v.
Southern Pac. R.R., z6 U.S. 138 (1885). There is no doubt that Conkling over-
stated his case. See Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 47 Y-A L.J. 371, 48 YAx L.J. i71 (1938). The "conspiracy theory"
of the amendment, according to which Conkling, John A. Bingham, and perhaps
Reverdy Johnson and others, operating in a smoke-filled room, secretly contrived
to extend the protection of substantive due process to corporations, has been pretty
well exploded, whatever the effect it may have had on the adjudications of the
Court in this field. See McLaughlin, The Court, The Corporation, and Conkling,
46 Am. HIST. REv. 45 (1940). And in any event, it would be very questionable
practice indeed, as Justice Black suggested, see Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, 303 US. 77, 87 (1938) (dissenting opinion), for the Court to deem itself
bound by the uncommunicated, back-room purpose of a handful of men. One of
the caveats applicable to the use of the legislative history of statutes is acutely
relevant here. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 45-49 (1948) (Justice
Frankfurter, dissenting) ; Curtis, supra note 6, at 411-12. But Justice Black, quot-
ing some unguarded language from the opinion of the Court in the Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (i6 Wall.) 36 (x873), went on to argue that it was inconsistent with
the purpose of the fourteenth amendment, as revealed by its history and language,
to extend the protection of the due process clause to corporations. Connecticut
Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, supra. See also Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337
U.S. 562, 576 (i949) (Justice Douglas, dissenting). The historical materials give no
more warrant for this view than for the so-called conspiracy theory. See pp. 3o-3i,
44, 6o-6i infra; Graham, supra at x7. But cf. Boudin, Truth and Fiction About
the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 N.Y.U.LQ. Rav. 19, 67 (1938).
4 FRANKxuRTER, Ma. JusTicE HoLis AND THE SuPREmm CoURT 76 (1938).
For a shining and enduring demonstration, see the opinion of Justice Bradley in
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 6x6, 624-32 (1886). For a nonjudicial tour de
force, see Thayer, Legal Tender, i HAnv. L. REv. 73 (1887).
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is relevant is not alone the origin of constitutional provisions, but
also "the line of their growth," the further links in the chain of
continuity."8 This being so and our law not being given to fol-
lowing hard and fast theoretical formulations on questions of the
scope of this one, it is possible, in the Chief Justice's words, for
historical materials to cast some light although they are inconclu-
sive and although, in any event, the clock cannot be turned back.
But only an examination in some detail of the relevant materials
themselves can make clear just how this has proved possible in the
Segregation Cases.
The Thirty-Ninth Congress and the Fourteenth Amendment
The discussion, by the parties and by the United States as
amicus, of the fourteenth amendment's history, which took place
in response to questions propounded by the Court in its order
for reargument of the Segregation Cases,'6 must surely have
amounted to the most extensive presentation of historical ma-
terials ever made to the Court. The briefs and appendices are
book-size and shelf-length. The heart of this mass of evidence
is to be found in the reported debates of the first session of the
3 9th Congress, which convened on December 4, 1865,17 and sent
the fourteenth amendment to the country on June 13, I866,"8
shortly before it adjourned to go home and face the electorate.
Other materials have a bearing, of course. But the debates of
the Congress which submitted, and the journals and documents
of the legislatures which ratified, the amendment provide the most
15 Justice Holmes in Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 6io (1914).
16 345 U.S. 972 (1953). The questions which concern us are as follows:
i. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and the State
legislatures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment con-
templated or did not contemplate, understood or did not understand, that it
would abolish segregation in public schools?
2. If neither the Congress in submitting nor the States in ratifying the
Fourteenth Amendment understood that compliance with it would require the
immediate abolition of segregation in public schools, was it nevertheless the
understanding of the framers of the Amendient
(a) that future Congresses might, in the exercise of their power under
section 5 of the Amendment, abolish such segregation, or
(b) that it would be within the judicial power, in light of future con-
ditions, to construe the Amendment as abolishing such segregation of its
own force?
3. On the assumption that the answers to questions 2(a) and (b) do not
dispose of the issue, is it within the judicial power, in construing the Amend-
ment, to abolish segregation in public schools?
17 CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., ist Sess. i (i86g). The Globe for this session will
hereinafter be cited GLOBE; its Appendix, GLOBE, App.
,s GLOBE 3149.
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direct and unimpeachable indication of original purpose and un-
derstanding- to the extent, of course, that any such indication
is to be found. Of these two sets of materials, the congressional
debates are in this case the richer, and they rank, in any event,
first in importance. It may perhaps be said that whatever they
establish constitutes a rebuttable presumption. For it is not
unrealistic, in the main, to assume notice of congressional pur-
pose in the state legislatures. A showing of ratification on the
basis of an understanding different from that revealed by con-
gressional materials must carry the burden of proof. And, of
course, the ratifying states are a chorus of voices; a discordant
one among them proves little.
Very much the better part of the first session of the 3 9th Con-
gress was devoted to discussing, in one connection or another, the
subject matter of the fourteenth amendment: the governance of
the South, readmission of the Southern states, loyalty to the
Union, a place under the sun for the newly freed negro race,
distribution of powers (in the context of these problems) between
the states and the federal government. The bulk of this session-
long debate may conveniently be analyzed as it related to four
measures: The Freedmen's Bureau Bill, which President Johnson
vetoed and which the Radicals failed to pass over his veto; the
Civil Rights Act of 1866,19 enacted over a veto; an abortive pro-
posal for a short constitutional amendment, whose sponsor was
John A. Bingham of Ohio; and the fourteenth amendment itself.
To obtain a proper understanding of the relevant congressional
purpose, it is necessary to concentrate not only on statements
dealing specifically with public school education of the negro
race, but also on remarks going to subjects which were deemed
to be closely allied - though the relationship may not have sur-
vived as clearly to this day. It will become plain that the right,
if any, to an unsegregated public school education resided for
most men who spoke at this session in a fringe area, where its
companions were, among other less well-defined rights, suffrage,
jury service, and intermarriage. The first two debates to be re-
viewed- those on the Freedmen's Bureau Bill and on the Civil
Rights Bill - were, of course, debates looking to legislation
rather than to a constitutional amendment, and they dealt with
an issue of constitutionality as well as one of policy. The former
arose under the thirteenth amendment, which had gone into ef-
19 Act of April 9, 1866, C. 31, 14 STAT. 27.
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fect not long before the 3 9 th Congress convened. The two
issues are not always easy to separate and must often be examined
in tandem. Finally, it is important to form an impression of the
political atmosphere of the session. The Democrats were a small
and - with a few exceptions - cowed minority. The dominant
Republicans consisted of three groups: Radicals, Moderates, and
conservative supporters of President Andrew Johnson. The first
two factions were to form an alliance which was to wage in 1866
a bitter and successful campaign against the President. That
coming event cast an unmistakable and significant shadow over
the session.
The Freedmen's Bureau Bill
The bill to enlarge the powers of the Freedmen's Bureau " pro-
vided in its section 7:
That whenever, in any State or district in which the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings has been interrupted by the rebel-
lion, and wherein, in consequence of any State or local law, ordi-
nance, police, or other regulation, custom, or prejudice, any of the
civil rights or immunities belonging to white persons, including
the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties and give
evidence; to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey . . .
property, and to have full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of person and estate, are refused or de-
nied to negroes . . . or wherein they . . . are subjected to any
. . . different punishment . . . for the commission of any act . . .
than are prescribed for white persons . . . it shall be the duty of
the President . . . to extend military protection .... ,,21
On the passage of this bill (on January 25 and February 8 in
the Senate,22 and on February 6 and 9 in the House 23) the Re-
publican Party, with one exception in the House, 24 and with the
notable absence in the Senate of Edgar Cowan, the Pennsylvania
Conservative, stood together. Senators Norton of Minnesota and
Van Winkle of West Virginia, who, with Cowan, later voted
against the Civil Rights Bill and against the fourteenth amend-
ment, were recorded for this bill. So was Senator Doolittle of Wis-
20 The Bureau had been created by Act of March 3, 1865, c. 9 o , 13 STAT. 507.
21 GLOBE 318.
22 GLOBE 421, 742, 748.
23 GLOBE 688, 77g.
24 Lovell H. Rousseau of Kentucky.
[Vol. 69
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consin, who was absent for the vote on the Civil Rights Bill but
who voted against the fourteenth amendment. These votes for
the Freedmen's Bureau Bill may seem inconsistent with Con-
servative actions later in the session. For the enumeration in sec-
tion 7 of "civil rights and immunities" was not exclusive. The
bill's coverage depended, therefore, on the meaning of those terms.
In the subsequent debate on the Civil Rights Bill, Conservatives
and others attacked similar general language as susceptible of a
"latitudinarian" construction, and the leadership deemed it wise
to strike it. But there are a number of explanations for these Con-
servative Republican votes in favor of the Freedmen's Bureau
Bill. For one thing, this bill drew constitutional validity from a
source - the war power - not open to the later Civil Rights Bill,
which applied throughout the country. Constitutional scruples to
the side, the fact that the Freedmen's Bureau Bill did not apply in
the North meant that there was no occasion to worry about fed-
eral interference with practices in that part of the country, which
was where constituents lived. Finally, it was not until after the
vote on this bill- certainly not until after the Senate vote on
January 25- that the struggle between President and Radical
Congress was publicly joined. Conservative Republicans who
later sided with the President, and many Moderates as well, still
entertained at this time some hope of averting the conflict. They
felt that if they gave in to Radical opinion on the Freedmen's
Bureau Bill their hand would be strengthened in attempts to
find common ground with the Radicals, and they had reason to
believe that the President would pursue the same strategy. It
was for a time commonly expected that Johnson would sign
the Freedmen's Bureau Bill.' 5 The President, however, vetoed
it on February 19, and the Senate, on the following day, failed
to override. 6 The President's supporters- the party whip and
illness were to deplete their ranks later - rallied around him.
In the course of debate on the Freedmen's Bureau Bill and on
a predecessor proposal which was briefly before the Senate,"1
Charles Sumner and Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, Radicals of
abolitionist antecedents, as well as John Sherman of Ohio and
"5 See R. HENRY, THE STORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 159 (1938); H. WmTE:, TH
Lims: Or Ly-kN TRUmBULL 260 (1913); HYAAN, ERA Or THE OATH 90-91 (X954).
21 GLOBE 915-17, 943.
27S. 9, 39th Cong., ist Sess. (1865), introduced by Senator Wilson of Massa-
chusetts. GLOBE 2, 39.
19551
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Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, Moderates, spoke in general terms of
measures that would have to be taken and existing practices that
would have to be eliminated, both now and in the long run, in
order to better the condition of the Negro in the South. They re-
ferred, among other things, to the Negro's need for, and right to,
education. In the House, Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota moved
an amendment to empower the Bureau to offer to refugees and
freedmen "a common-school education." 25 These remarks and the
Donnelly amendment are evidence of a real concern in Congress
with education of the Southern Negro, of which we shall see more.
But, except perhaps for Sumner's speech, none of them can be read
as advocating unsegregated schools, or as assuming that the bill
would lead to their establishment.2 9 Nor, apart from a broadside
28 GLOBE 513. The amendment was never voted on directly. It was lost to-
gether with a substitute bill, in which it was incorporated and which proposed
other changes not here relevant. GLOBE 654, 655, 688. Section 6 of the bill, as it
then stood and as finally passed, see MCPRERSON, HISTORY OF THE RECONSTRUCTION
73 (x87z), in any event empowered the Bureau to provide or cause to be built
suitable buildings for asylums and schools. GLOBE 210.
" Wilson enumerated the rights listed in the bill and added the freedman's
right to "go into the schools and educate himself and his children." GLOBE :II.
But he Was speaking of rights which would obtain if Southern Black Codes, deny-
ing, as he believed, any schooling at all, were annulled by passage of this bill. And
he was speaking against the background of a report on conditions in the South by
a Republican politician and Union major general, the former German revolutionary
Carl Schurz, which the Senate had requested from the President and had had
printed. GLOBE 30, 78-So. This report dealt with "Education of the Freedmen" and
discussed the opposition to it of Southern whites. It recommended education for
the Negro "as an integral part of the educational systems of the States," but spoke
throughout of "negro education," "colored schools," "school-houses in which
colored children were taught," and the desirability only of supporting schools for
freedmen out of general tax funds to which Negroes contributed and from which
white schools benefited. There were no references to unsegregated schools, even as
an ultimate objective, in the Schurz Report. S. Exsc. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., ist
Sess. 2, 2g5-27 (1865). The problem to which Wilson was addressing himself was
the establishment and maintenance of segregated schools for freedmen, which he
believed to be a matter of some difficulty in the South of that day. The same is
true of a reference by Sherman to "the right to be educated," GLOBE 42, and by
Trumbull to the need "to educate, improve, enlighten, and Christianize the negro,"
GLOBE 322. Donnelly, arguing for his amendment, spoke of the value of education
for both the white and colored races. Conceiving, obviously, of the separate edu-
cation of the Negro, he said it would "shame the whites into an effort to educate
themselves." He noted that Tennessee excluded Negroes from white schools, "while
it makes no provision for their education in separate schools," that, evidently, being
what he found objectionable. GLOBE 586, 587, 589.
There is no doubt that Charles Sumner favored unsegregated schools. See his
argument in Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.), 198, 2oi (1849), and his draft
of what, in amended form, became the Civil Rights Act of 1875, CoNG. GLOBE,
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Democratic attack in the House aimed more at future Radical
objectives than at this particular bill, did the opposition so assume
or argue.30
The Civil Rights Bill
On January 29, 1866, before passage in the House of the Freed-
men's Bureau Bill, Lyman Trumbull of Illinois brought up in
the Senate the Civil Rights Bill. Section i of the bill contained,
as had section 7 of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, a general pro-
hibition of "discrimination in civil rights or immunities," which
preceded a specific enumeration of such rights. Section i, after
conferring citizenship on native-born Negroes, provided:
That there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immuni-
ties among the inhabitants of any State or Territory of the United
States on account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery;
but the inhabitants of every race and color, without regard to any
previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall have the same right to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to
42d Cong., 2d Sess. 383-84 (1872). His general remarks on this occasion may indi-
cate that he would have liked to see unsegregated schools started in the South at
this time. However, speaking specifically of the bill before the Senate, he used
more guarded language. It proposed, he said, "nothing less than to establish Equal-
ity before the Law, at least so far as civil rights are concerned, in the rebel States."
GLOBE 91.
10 Lovell Rousseau of Kentucky, the Conservative Republican who was to vote
against the bill, criticized the Freedmen's Bureau for having taken over school-
houses in Charleston for the benefit of colored children. The white children were
thus deprived of instruction, unless-and this was put as a preposterous proposi-
tion- "they mix up white children with black." GLOBE, App. 71. This same action
of the Bureau was denounced also by John W. Chanler, Democrat of New York.
GLOBE, App. 82.
The Democratic broadside was by John L. Dawson of Pennsylvania. He ac-
cused the Radicals who sponsored this bill of hugging to their bosoms "the phantom
of negro equality." The Radicals, he said,
hold that the white and black races are equal. This they maintain involves
and demands social equality; that negroes should be received on an equality
in white families, should be admitted to the same tables at hotels, should be
permitted to occupy the same seats in railroad cars and the same pews in
churches; that they should be allowed to hold offices, to sit on juries, to vote,
to be eligible to seats in the State and national Legislatures, and to be judges,
or to make and expound laws for the government of white men. Their chil-
dren are to attend the same schools with white children, and to sit side by
side with them. Following close upon this will, of course, be marriages between
the races . ...
GLOBE 541.
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full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of person and property, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.
Section 2 provided, by way of enforcement power:
That any person who under color of any law . . . or custom,
shall subject . . . any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the
deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act . . .
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction shall
be punished by fine not exceeding $i,ooo, or imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or both . . . .
In opening debate, Trumbull, who was no Radical, said that
the bill was intended to "secure to all persons within the United
States practical freedom." It was, he said, a question of securing
"privileges which are essential to freemen." He reviewed the
Slave Codes which had fallen with the proclamation of the thir-
teenth amendment. They restricted the movements of Negroes;
they forbade them to own firearms; they punished the exercise
by them of the functions of a minister of the Gospel; they ex-
cluded them from other occupations; and they made it "a
highly penal offense for any person, white or colored, to teach
slaves . . . ." In lieu of Slave Codes, Trumbull said, the South
now had Black Codes and these "still impose upon [Negroes] . . .
the very restrictions which were imposed upon them in conse-
quence of the existence of slavery, and before it was abolished.
The purpose of the bill under consideration is to destroy all these
discriminations . . . ." Section i, Trumbull continued, was the
heart of the bill; it was there that "civil liberty" was secured to
the Negro, "civil liberty" being what was left of "natural liberty"
after the latter had, necessarily, been circumscribed to make
possible life in society. It was of the essence of civil liberty that
laws be brought to bear on all persons equally, "or as much so
as the nature of things will admit."
Trumbull concluded his remarks on section i by repeating
that it would ensure for the Negro "the rights of citizens . . ..
The great fundamental rights set forth in this bill: the right to
acquire property, the right to go and come at pleasure, the right
to enforce rights in the courts, to make contracts, and to inherit
and dispose of property. These are the very rights that are set
3' GLOBE 474, 475-
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forth in this bill as appertaining to every freeman." When Trum-
bull had finished, James A. McDougall of California, a Demo-
crat, asked him to return to section i. What, again, was meant
by "civil rights"? Trumbull answered by reading the enumera-
tion of rights in section i. That was the definition. Was there
any reference to political rights, McDougall pursued? No, said
Trumbull.3 2
With the single exception of Lot M. Morrill of Maine, a Radical
who, looking beyond the bill at hand, expounded a theory of the
equality of the races,3 others - Radicals and Moderates alike -
who spoke in favor of the bill were content to rest on the points
Trumbull had made. The rights to be secured by the bill were
those specifically enumerated in section i, and the necessity for
extending the protection so defined was demonstrated by the
Black Codes enacted by Southern legislatures.34 On its merits,
this argument had one or two weaknesses. It disregarded the
general civil rights guaranty which preceded the enumeration of
rights in section i, and, in directing attention only to evils existing
in the South, it ignored the fact that the bill was to apply through-
out the nation. These weaknesses were to be skillfully seized
upon. The argument probably had another, which the opposition
let pass, and which does not affect the search for congressional
purpose. It is very likely that Trumbull and his fellows exag-
gerated the severity of the Black Codes. The picture - of which
this exaggeration was a feature - of a willful reign of terror
instituted or threatened by fire-eating Southerners who had
learned nothing and were unreconciled to defeat and to all its
consequences served Radical purposes and was, with varying
degrees of sincerity and of unwitting assistance from some South-
ern politicians, being spread broadcast by the Radical leadership.
This educational campaign, as the Radicals called it, was to con-
32 GLOBE 474-75, 476.
33 GLOBE 570.
14 See the remarks of Henry Wilson, the Massachusetts Radical, who was to be
Grant's Vice-President. GLOBE 6o3. Trumbull, who closed, again and in the same
terms laid stress on the bill's relatively narrow purpose. GLOBE 6o5. John Sherman
of Ohio, a Moderate, speaking on February 8 in justification of his votes in favor
both of the Freedmen's Bureau and Civil Rights Bills, read section 1 of the latter
bill as defining "what are the incidents of freedom, and [saying] that these men
must be protected in certain rights, and so careful is it in its language that it goes
on and defines those rights, the right to sue and be sued, to plead and be impleaded,
to acquire and hold property, and other universal incidents of freedom." GLOBE
744-
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tinue throughout the session and beyond. But no one maintains
that the impression of conditions in the South fostered by the
Radicals was completely unjustified. And, in any event, what is
important here is the fact of its existence and of its effectiveness,
not the truth of the matter asserted. This impression is incor-
porated by reference into congressional statements of objectives;
it plays a large part in defining those objectives, regardless of
the extent to which it was founded in reality and regardless of the
motives which underlay its creation. 5
Of the remarks in opposition in the Senate, those of three men
- two of them Democrats, the other a nominal Republican, but
an avowed supporter of the President - must be noted. 6 Wil-
lard Saulsbury of Delaware, a Democrat who had once described
himself wistfully as perhaps the last slaveholder in the nation,
declared that the bill was "one of the most dangerous that was
ever introduced into the Senate of the United States." He at-
tacked its constitutionality, then asked whether the bill conferred
the right to vote. Certainly, he said, Trumbull might have no in-
tention of conferring that right. But:
The question is not what the senator means, but what is the
legitimate meaning and import of the terms employed in the
35 A number of Black Codes are collected in i FLEMING, DOCUMxENTARY HIs-
TORY or RECONSTRUCTION 273-312 (19o6), and in McPHERSON, op. cit. supra note
28, at 29-44". The worst of them were vagrancy statutes and laws minutely regulat-
ing the master-servant relationship, which was taking the place of slavery but
appeared in some respects to bear a striking resemblance to it. But there were also
enactments such as an Alabama statute of December 9, 1865, permitting Negro
testimony in court and a Florida statute of January 16, 1866, setting up schools
of a sort for freedmen. Both of these are cited by Fleming. They are to be dis-
tinguished from an Arkansas statute of February 6, 1867, printed in the same
place, which was passed after the Civil Rights Act had become effective, and which
more or less followed its pattern. One of the principal instruments used to popular-
ize the Radical picture of the South, especially in Congress, was the Schurz Report.
See note 29 supra. In the election campaign of 1866, much use was made of records
of hearings before subcommittees of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. These,
however, were not in print before Congress passed the fourteenth amendment. See
notes 61, 77, 83, 97 infra. See also HENRY, op. cit. supra note 25, at 108-10, 115-16.
11 There were in addition two violent harangues by Garrett Davis of Ken-
tucky, a Democrat and a thoroughly unreconstructed one. The first was not
unfairly characterized in an interruption by Senator Clark (Rep., N.H.). Said
Mr. Clark: "[Ilt only comes back to this, that a nigger is a nigger." Said Mr.
Davis: "That is the whole of it." GLOBE 529. In the second, Davis argued that
the bill discriminated against whites by creating special rights for Negroes. He
drew from Trumbull the reply that "this bill applies to white men as well as black
men. It declares that all persons in the United States shall be entitled to the same
civil rights .... The bill is applicable exclusively to civil rights." GLOBE 599.
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bill. . . . What are civil rights? What are the rights which you,
I, or any citizen of this country enjoy? . . . [H]ere you use a
generic term which in its most comprehensive signification includes
every species of right that man can enjoy other than those the
foundation of which rests exclusively in nature and in the law of
nature.3
7
Edgar Cowan, Republican of Pennsylvania, who was wholly at
odds with the Radical leadership, also took a broad view of the
effect of the bill. He said:
Now, as I understand the meaning and intent of this bill, it is
that there shall be no discrimination made between the inhabitants
of the several States of this Union, none in any way. In Pennsyl-
vania, for the greater convenience of the people, and for the
greater convenience, I may say, of both classes of the people, in
certain districts the Legislature has provided schools for colored
children, has discriminated as between the two classes of children.
We put the African children in this school-house, . . . and edu-
cate them there as best we can. Is this amendment [the thirteenth;
the proponents of the Civil Rights Bill argued that it implemented
this amendment] to the Constitution of the United States abolish-
ing slavery to break up that system which Pennsylvania has adopted
for the education of her white and colored children? Are the school
directors who carry out that law and who make this distinction
between these classes of children to be punished for a violation of
this statute of the United States? To me it is monstrous.3 8
It was quite a different thing, Cowan continued, to grant to every-
one "the right to life, the right to liberty, the right to property."
This he was willing to do. But it had to be by amendment to the
Constitution.
Reverdy Johnson, Democrat of Maryland, one of the great
lawyers of his time, offered an analysis of the bill which came to
the same point Saulsbury had made. The states, in the exercise
37 GLOBE 476-77.
38 GLOBE 5oo. Presumably the dire consequences Cowan feared would come
about because the bill forbade discrimination in civil rights, and in Cowan's mind,
as in Saulsbury's, and as in Reverdy Johnson's, see note 39 infra, that term was
susceptible of a broad interpretation. But when, in closing, Trumbull turned on
him asking whether, everything else being equal, Cowan was not in favor of ex-
tending "equal civil rights" to the Negro, Cowan, who had already said much and
was to say yet more as the session progressed about the inferior place of the
Negro in a society governed for and by the Caucasian race, replied, "Certainly."
GLOBE 6o5. In this instance, he evidently accepted the narrow meaning attributed
to the phrase by the majority.
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of their police power, had always, and had, in Johnson's opinion,
properly taken account of the prejudices of the people. When
legislators failed to do that, they created the sort of situation
which had resulted from the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act;
they passed unenforceable legislation. "I mention that," said
Johnson, "for the purpose of applying it to one of the provisions
of this bill." Most states had legislated against miscegenation.
Yet this bill, Johnson believed, would wipe all such legislation
off the books. Trumbull, and William Pitt Fessenden of Maine,
like Trumbull a Moderate, interrupted to dispute this interpreta-
tion. Negroes could not marry whites and whites could not marry
Negroes, they argued; hence there could be no discrimination in
an antimiscegenation statute. But neither Fessenden nor Trum-
bull answered Johnson's broader point, which was that even if his
interpretation was wrong, the error was not "so gross a one that
the courts may not fall into it." 39
The vote on the passage of the Civil Rights Bill in the Senate,
on February 2, was 33 ayes, 12 nays. Three Republicans, Cowan,
Norton of Minnesota, and Van Winkle of West Virginia, were
recorded against.40
James F. Wilson of Iowa, from the House Committee on the
Judiciary, managing the bill in the House, brought it up there on
March i. This was after the President's veto of the Freedmen's
Bureau Bill had been upheld. Wilson addressed himself to Sec-
tion I:
This part of the bill . . . .provides for the equality of citizens
of the United States in the enjoyment of "civil rights and immuni-
ties." What do these terms mean? Do they mean that in all things
civil, social, political, all citizens without distinction of race or
color, shall be equal? By no means can they be so construed. Do
they mean that all citizens shall vote in the several States? No
. . . .Nor do they mean that all citizens shall sit on the juries, or
that their children shall attend the same schools. These are not
3 GLOBE 5o5-o6.
40 GLOBE 606-07. Reverdy Johnson was absent. So was James R. Doolittle of
Wisconsin, a Republican but a close friend of the President. The veto of the Freed-
men's Bureau Bill and the definitive public -breach between President and Radical
Congress, which it signified, were still some two weeks away. But Thaddeus
Stevens in the House already spoke of the President in ominous tones. GLOBE
536-37; see note 61 infra. And Conservative Republicans who considered the
Freedmen's Bureau Bill an appropriate concession to offer to the Radicals,
evidently felt quite differently about a statute which might be applied in their
constituenciem,
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civil rights or immunities. Well, what is the meaning? What are
civil rights? I understand civil rights to be simply the absolute
rights of individuals, such as -
. "The right of personal security, the right of personal liberty,
and the right to acquire and enjoy property." "Right itself, in
civil society, is that which any man is entitled to have, or to
do, or to require from others, within the limits of prescribed
law." Kent's Commentaries, vol. i, p. 199.
But what of the term "immunities"? . . . It merely secures to
citizens of the United States equality in the exemptions of the law.
A colored citizen shall not, because he is colored, be subjected to
obligations, duties, pains . . . . This is the spirit and scope of the
bill, and it goes not one step beyond.
... . Laws barbaric and treatment inhuman are the rewards
meted out by our white enemies to our colored friends. We should
put a stop to this at once and forever.
41
Wilson thus presented the Civil Rights Bill to the House as a
measure of limited and definite objectives. In this he followed the
lead of the majority in the Senate. Indeed, his disclaimers of
wider coverage were more specific than those made in the Senate.
And the line he laid down was followed by others who spoke for
the bill in the House. Again, the Black Codes were referred to,
and again the point was made that the term civil rights was de-
fined by section i, which enumerated the rights in question.4 -
The Democratic assault on the bill commenced when George
S. Shanklin o Kentucky asked Wilson to allow an amendment
stating explicitly that nothing in the bill conferred the right to
vote. Wilson, though he was soon to give in, refused to agree to
4 GLOBE 1i17, 1118.
42 The Black Codes were the evil to which the bill was directed in the view of
Burton C. Cook of Illinois, Russell Thayer of Pennsylvania, and William Windom
of Minnesota, Radicals all. G.OBE 1123-25, 1151, 1i6o. Thayer added that the
bill simply declared "that all men born upon the soil of the United States shall
enjoy the fundamental rights of citizenship. What rights are these? Why, sir, in
order to avoid any misapprehension they are stated in the bill." And the bill
could not possibly be read to confer suffrage. GLOBE iigi. Windom pointed out
that the bill did not confer either political or social rights. GLOBE 159. And
John M. Broomall of Pennsylvania, another Radical, said the bill secured rights
denied to the Negro in the South; he named these rights: speech, transit, domicil,
to sue, to petition, and habeas corpus. GLOBE X263.
19551
HeinOnline  -- 69 Harv. L. Rev.  17 1955-1956
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
such a provision, "as it is in the bill now." 43 Next came Andrew
Jackson Rogers of New Jersey, a member, as we shall see, of the
joint Committee on Reconstruction, and, though under forty, a
very prominent figure in the 3 9 th Congress. Because his views
were sometimes extreme and his language frequently vehement,
some of the House Democrats resisted Rogers' leadership, and
the Radicals, on the other hand, were often pleased to act on the
bland assumption that Rogers was the official Democratic leader
in the House, though he held no such position. 44 A few days pre-
viously, Rogers had had occasion to take note of the Civil Rights
Bill as passed in the Senate. At that time he had seemed to favor
most of what he took to be the objectives of section i. His attack
had been constitutional:
Negroes should have the channels of education opened to them
by the States, and by the States they should be protected in life,
liberty, and property, and by the States should be allowed all the
rights of being witnesses, of suing and being sued ....
Who gave the Senate the constitutional power to pass that bill
guarantying equal rights to all . . . ?
In this debate he made the same constitutional point. But he
took a broader and less benign view of the effect of section i:
In the State of Pennsylvania there is a discrimination made be-
tween the schools for white children and the schools for black.
"3 GLOBE 1120.
"E.g.: "Mr. Windom [a Radical] .... I was somewhat surprised yesterday
in listening to the argument of the gentleman who, I believe, is the recognized
leader of the Democratic party of the House - the gentleman from New
Jersey ....
"Mr. Rogers. Mr. Speaker -
"Mr. Windom. Have I done him too much honor?
"Mr. Rogers. Mr. Speaker, I hope nobody . . . will make that assertion again.
The object . . .is only to create dissatisfaction on this side of the House.
"Mr. Marshall. I wish merely to say that we do not recognize him as our
leader.
"Mr. Windom .... I think every member upon this side of the House and
every modest member upon the other side accords to the gentleman from New
Jersey the position I assign him. [Laughter.]
"Mr. Niblack. I desire simply to say that we on this side do not need any
'leader'. There are not enough of us. [Laughter.] Therefore every man carries
on a kind of guerrilla fight." GLOBE 1157-58.
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The laws there provide that certain schools shall be set apart for
black persons, and certain schools shall be set apart for white per-
sons. . . [T]here is nothing in the letter of the Constitution
which gives . . . authority to Congress [to interfere] ....
... . As a white man is by law authorized to marry a white
woman, so does this bill compel the State to grant to the negro
the same right of marrying a white woman ....
All the rights that we enjoy, except our natural rights, are de-
rived from Government. Therefore, there are really but two kinds
of rights, natural rights and civil rights. This bill, then, would
prevent a State from refusing negro suffrage under the broad ac-
ceptation of the term "civil rights and immunities." 45
These charges, with particular reference to suffrage, were pressed
home for the Democrats by Anthony Thornton of Illinois:
It is said that the words "civil rights" do not include the right
of suffrage, because that is a political right. . . . I do not assume
. . . that [they] do . . . but with the loose and liberal mode of
construction adopted in this age, who can tell what rights may not
be conferred by virtue of the terms as used in this bill? Where
is it to end? Who can tell how it may be defined, how it may be
construed? Why not, then, if it is not intended to confer the right
of suffrage upon this class, accept a proviso that no such design is
entertained? 46
The leadership, which was to be unsure of its majority, and hence
sensitive on the issue of suffrage throughout the session, had had
enough of this. Wilson moved to amend by adding a new section,
as follows:
That nothing in this act shall be so construed as to affect the
laws of any State concerning the right of suffrage.
He said:
Mr. Speaker, I wish to say [that] . . . that section will not
change my construction of the bill. I do not believe the term civil
rights includes the right of suffrage. Some gentlemen seem to have
some fear on that point.
" GLOBE, App. 134; GLOBE 1121-22.
46 GLOBE Ix57.
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The House adopted the amendment by voice vote.47
The Democrats were, of course, not pacified by this concession.
Their concluding shot was fired by Michael C. Kerr of Indiana.
Power to enact this bill was sought, he said, in the amendment
abolishing slavery. But:
Is it slavery or involuntary servitude to forbid a free negro, on
account of race or color, to testify against a white man? Is it
either to deny to free negroes, on the same account, the privilege
of engaging in certain kinds of business . . . such as retailing
spirituous liquors? Is it either to deny to children of free negroes or
mulattoes, on the like account, the privilege of attending the com-
mon schools of a State with the children of white men?
These were all matters, apparently, in Kerr's mind, with which
the bill might be thought to deal. He himself favored letting
Negroes testify and "providing facilities for the education of
their children." But he thought Congress was powerless to attain
these ends. And the construction which might' in practice be
given to the term "civil rights" was quite unpredictable and
would not be controlled by disclaimers made on the floor of the
House.
48
Despite its vigor, this Democratic attack might well have gone
unheeded, as had the similar one in the Senate, and changes in
the Senate draft might have ended with the suffrage amendment
accepted by Wilson, had it not been for misgivings in the regular
Republican ranks in the House as well. These came from three
fairly distinct quarters. Henry J. Raymond of New York, pub-
lisher of the New York Times, and not a Radical, favored extend-
47 GLOBE 3162.
4s GLOBE 1268. It is not at all clear that the reference in the full paragraph
quoted in the text to attendance at common schools "with the children of white
men" means that Kerr thought the bill would require establishment of unsegregated
schools rather than separate Negro schools, forming part of a state's educational
system. Kerr's further remark can be read to imply that he took the educational
objective of the bill to be segregated Negro schools, and that he favored it, subject
to his constitutional scruples. But he did go on to express general apprehension
concerning the meaning of the term "civil rights": "What are [civil] rights? One
writer says civil rights are those which have no relation to the establishment,
support, or management of the Government. Another says they are the rights of a
citizen; rights due from one citizen to another, the privation of which is a civil
injury for which redress may be sought by a civil action. Other authors define all
these terms in different ways .... Who shall define these terms? Their defini-
tion here by gentlemen on this floor is one thing; their definition after this bill
shall have become law will be quite another thing." GLOBE 1270-71.
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ing to Negroes the "rights and privileges" of citizens. By that
he understood the right of free passage, to bear arms, to testify,
"all those rights that tend to elevate [the Negro] and educate
him for still higher reaches in the process of elevation." Giving
the Negro the rights of citizenship "will teach all others of his
fellow-citizens of all races to respect him more, and to aid him
in his steps for constant progress and advancement in the rights
and duties that belong to citizenship." 49 But Raymond thought
that.the bill's penal enforcement provisions rendered it unconsti-
tutional, and he therefore opposed it as a whole, though he did
not seem to subscribe to the alarmist view of the scope of section i.
Perhaps it was simply that the position he took made a close anal-
ysis of that section unnecessary.
Columbus Delano of Ohio, a Moderate, shared Raymond's con-
stitutional difficulties. He inclined to the belief that these might
be removed if the general civil rights language at the head of
section i and the penal provisions further on were struck. But,
unlike Raymond, Delano feared that the bill might be construed
to outlaw a wide variety of practices prevalent in the North as
well as in the South. This was a question of policy, and Delano
was concerned about the entire first section, not just the sentence
at the beginning. He asked Wilson whether the provision in the
body of section i entitling Negroes "to full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property
as is enjoyed by white citizens" (the italicized phrase was not in
the bill as passed by the Senate but was added in committee in
the House and appears in the statute as enacted) would not con-
fer "upon the emancipated race the right of being jurors." Wilson
thought not.
Mr. Delano. I have no doubt of the sincerity of the gentleman,
and . . . I have great confidence in his legal opinions . ...
But, with all this, I must confess that it does seem to me that this
bill necessarily confers the right of being jurors . ...
Now, sir . . . I presume that the gentleman himself will shrink
from the idea of conferring upon this race now, at this particular
moment, the right of being jurors, or from so wording this bill as
49 GLOBF 1120, 1266. To the same general effect, see remarks of Thomas T.
Davis of New York. GLOBE 1265. But Davis, in the end, voted for the bill and to
override the veto.
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to leave it a serious question and render it debatable hereafter in
the courts or elsewhere.
Moreover:
[W] e once had in the State of Ohio a law excluding the black
population from any participation in the public schools . . .. That
law did not, of course, place the black population upon an equal
footing with the white, and would, therefore, under the terms of
this bill be void .... 50
Here Wilson broke in with "I desire to ask the gentleman," but
Delano had no further time for interruptions, and so there was
no argument on this point. It is to be noted that Delano was not
suggesting that Ohio would be forced to provide unsegregated
schools; he was predicting only the fall of laws which excluded
Negroes from schools of any sort. Despite these views, which
were not met by amendment insofar as they related to provi-
sions in the body of section i, Delano ended up voting for the
bill and to override the President's veto.
The final expression of Republican misgivings was the most
formidable, and it was decisive. It came from John A. Bingham
of Ohio, a Radical, and one of the most influential men in the
3 9 th Congress. Bingham was speaking in support of a motion
he had offered to recommit with instructions to strike the sentence
at the head of section i which forbade all "discrimination in civil
rights or immunities," and to substitute for the penal enforce-
ment provisions of the bill language permitting a civil action by
aggrieved parties.51 He tried at the start to meet an argument
which he knew would be advanced against him, as indeed it was:
Mr. Speaker . . . I beg leave . . . to say, that although the
objections which I urge against the bill must, in the very nature of
the case, apply to the proposed instructions, I venture to say no
candid man, no rightminded man, will deny that by amending as
proposed the bill will be less oppressive, and therefore less objec-
tionable. Doubting, as I do, the power of Congress to pass the bill,
I urge the instructions with a view to take from the bill what seems
to me its oppressive and I might say its unjust provisions.
Bingham then proceeded to examine the civil rights provision
5o GLOBE, App. 156-58.
"' GLOBE 1266, 1271-72.
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which he proposed to delete. "What are civil rights?" he asked.
It seemed that,
the term civil rights includes every right that pertains to the citizen
under the Constitution, laws, and Government of this country. ....
[A] re not political rights all embraced in the term "civil rights,"
and must it not of necessity be so interpreted?
... . [T]here is scarcely a State in this Union which does not,
by its constitution or by its statute laws, make some discrimination
on account of race or color between citizens of the United States
in respect of civil rights.
By the Constitution of my own State neither the right of the
elective franchise nor the franchise of office can be conferred . . .
save upon a white citizen of the United States.
Coming to the specific rights enumerated in that part of section i
which his motion would have left untouched, Bingham noted that
they had been denied by many states, and said: "I should remedy
that not by an arbitrary assumption of power, but by amending
the Constitution of the United States, expressly prohibiting the
States from any such abuse of power in the future." He had
made no such statement about civil rights in general. He went
on then to attack the penal enforcement provisions as unwise
as well as unconstitutional. The federal government, by con-
stitutional amendment, could protect the rights of life, liberty,
and property in the manner Bingham had just described. State
officials would then take an oath to observe such a prohibition as
he envisioned, and Congress could somehow enforce the oath.
But Congress had never, it could not, and it should not, employ
"the terrors of the penal code within organized States." The
Freedmen's Bureau Bill had been carefully worded to apply only
in territories under military occupation. Bingham quoted de
Tocqueville: " 'centralized government, decentralized adminis-
tration.' That, sir, coupled with your declared purpose of equal
justice, is the secret of your strength and power." That should be
the rule in peacetime. He quoted also from Chancellor Kent on
the powers that properly belong to the states. Then occurred
these passages:
Now what does this bill propose? To reform the whole civil and
criminal code of every State government by declaring that there
shall be no discrimination between citizens on account of race or
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color in civil rights or in the penalties prescribed by their laws. I
humbly bow before the majesty of justice, as I bow before the
majesty of that God whose attribute it is, and therefore declare
there should be no such inequality or discrimination even in the
penalties for crime; but what power have you to correct it? . . .
You further say that . . . there shall, as to qualification of wit-
nesses, be no discrimination on account of race or color. I agree
that . . . there should be no such discrimination.
But whence do you derive power to cure it by a congressional
enactment? There should be no discrimination among citizens of
the United States in the several States, of like sex, age, and con-
dition, in regard to the franchises of office. But such a discrim-
ination does exist in nearly every State. How do you propose to
cure all this? By a congressional enactment? How? Not by
saying, in so many words, which would be the bold and direct
way of meeting this issue, that every discrimination of this kind
. . . is hereby abolished. You propose to make it a penal offense
for the judges of the States to obey the constitution and laws of
their States . . . I deny your power to do this. You cannot make
an official act, done under color of law . . . and from a sense of
public duty, a crime.
52
Such was Bingham's position, and it is not lacking in ambiguity.
Like Raymond, he thought the bill was unconstitutional, but he
did not take the narrow ground of section 2 only; the bill for him
was unconstitutional from top to bottom. Hence, unlike Delano,
he made no pretense that his motion would cure the constitutional
defect. With Delano, apparently unlike Raymond, and certainly
unlike Wilson and his supporters, he read the general term "civil
rights" broadly, or at any rate thought it was of uncertain reach.
In the first half of his speech, it is perfectly clear that Bingham,
while committing himself to the need for safeguarding by consti-
tutional amendment the specific rights enumerated in the body of
section i, was anything but willing to make a similar commit-
ment with respect to "civil rights" in general. The second half of
the speech, in which Bingham bore down heavily on penal sanc-
tions as provided in section 2, ends in some ambiguity. Bingham
said first that he wanted no such sanctions applied to violations
of rights which he was ready to enshrine in the Constitution. He
mentioned the rights of life, liberty, and property, and the ideal
of equal justice: the sort of thing enumerated in the body of
52 GLOBE 129-93.
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section i. Then, in the last two paragraphs, while still pressing
his fight against penal sanctions, he referred both to rights specifi-
cally listed in section i and to at least one other which in his view
was covered by the term "civil rights." And he went on record as
opposed on principle to discriminations with respect to all these
rights. But was he, in these two final paragraphs, spoken just be-
fore the hammer fell, hastening to say something he had rather
carefully and gingerly refrained from saying before, namely that
he was prepared to write what he considered to be the substance of
a general "civil rights" provision into the Constitution? On their
face, and following as they do a lecture on federalism, these re-
marks are quite consistent with a belief that some discrimina-
tions, practiced in the North as well as in the South, though ob-
jectionable on moral principle, to be sure, should be cured by
state rather than federal action. Bingham's professions here are
high-flown. They call on God and the majesty of justice, and
they differ rather markedly from his earlier flat and specific
declaration concerning the evils he would remedy by amending
the Constitution. Are these not the sort of soothing but vague
and vacuous concessions Bingham was likely to offer to his
Radical colleagues while trying to induce them to rebel against
at least one feature of a leadership bill? Similarly, in denouncing
criminal sanctions imposed, as he thought, against state officials
for denying the franchise to Negroes, Bingham may seem in this
passage to suggest that he would have approved a "bold and
direct" congressional enactment declaring "that every discrim-
ination of this kind . . . is hereby abolished." Yet if his speech
as an entirety means anything at all, it means that he would
have considered such a "bold and direct" congressional enactment
unconstitutional.
These are words spoken in debate by a man not normally dis-
tinguished for precision of thought and statement. Perhaps judg-
ments may differ about them, though they must not be taken out
of context. One makes out their meaning as best one can. They
are important because of Bingham's role in drafting section i of
the fourteenth amendment and his avoidance in all his drafts of
the term "civil rights." Whatever the ambiguities of his speech,
one thing is certain. Unless one concludes that Bingham enter-
tained apprehensions about the breadth of the term "civil rights"
and was unwilling at this stage, as a matter of policy, not con-
stitutional law, to extend a federal guaranty covering all that
1gss1
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might be included in that term, there is no rational explanation
for his motion to strike it. There was no illusion in Bingham's
mind of removing a constitutional infirmity in this fashion. He
was endeavoring merely to make the bill less "oppressive," less
"unjust." Constitutional scruples to the side, he wanted a bill
that would at least be satisfactory on policy grounds. That was
the object of his attempt to remove the penal provisions. What
other object could he have had in mind in trying also to eliminate
the comprehensive civil rights guaranty, which in his opinion
would force a change in the law of his own state?
Wilson, the manager of the bill, who rose to answer Bingham,
had understood the latter as objecting to the breadth of the "civil
rights" provision. He defended the term "civil rights" in accord-
ance with the line he had laid down at the beginning of debate.
Bingham, he said,
tells the House that civil rights involve all the rights that citizens
have under the Government . . . that this bill is not intended
merely to enforce equality of rights, so far as they relate to citi-
zens of the United States, but invades the States to enforce equal-
ity of rights in respect to those things which properly and right-
fully depend on State regulations and laws. My friend .... knows,
as every man knows, that this bill refers to those rights which be-
long to men as citizens of the United States and none other; and
when he talks of setting aside the school laws and jury laws and
franchise laws of the States by the bill .. .he steps beyond what
he must know to be the rule of construction which must apply
here, and as a result of which this bill can only relate to matters
within the control of Congress.
This misrepresented Bingham's statement in that it had him re-
ferring specifically to school and jury laws, which Bingham had
not done. Wilson also implied that Bingham had argued, as
Bingham had not, that his motion would remove the constitutional
infirmity he saw in the bill. It could not, said Wilson. If any part
of section i was unconstitutional, all of it had to be.5
3
"' Wilson also said:
I find in the bill of rights ...that "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law." I understand that these
constitute the civil rights belonging to the citizens in connection with those
which are necessary for the protection and maintenance and perfect enjoy-
ment of the rights thus specifically named, and these are the rights to which
this bill relates, having nothing to do with subjects submitted to the control
of the several States.
GLOBE 1294-95.
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Bingham complained generally, in one sentence, that "the
gentleman from Iowa has taken advantage of me by misstating
my position." " The voting then began. Wilson asked whether
"' GLOBE 1295. Commentators who have looked into the matter have tended
to oversimplify Bingham's position. In the first work on the subject, he is repre-
sented as objecting to the bill "entirely upon constitutional grounds." See FLACK,
TiE ADoPTIo OF THE FOuRTEENTH AmENDMENT 35 (i908). Similarly, in a recent
article, Mr. Howard Jay Graham leaves the reader with the impression that the
debate on the Civil Rights Bill in the House turned wholly on the issue of con-
stitutionality, dealt, that is, entirely with means, not ends. The implication is that
Wilson on the one hand and Bingham and those Republicans who held views
similar to his on the other, were all along in agreement concerning the ends which
the Civil Rights Bill would attain and concerning their desirability. See Graham,
Our "Declaratorv" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAe. L. REv. 3, 12-18 (1954). This
may be true as applied to Raymond. It is true insofar as it indicates that
Bingham and Wilson were at one in their understanding of the specific ends
aimed at by section 3 in its final form, and that Bingham regarded the attainment
of these ends by appropriate federal action as desirable. An assertion so limited
is supported by a passage from Bingham's speech which, as quoted by Mr.
Graham, starts as follows: "I say, with all my heart, that [the First Section]
. . . should be the law of every State . . . ." Id. at 15. The reference in Mr.
Graham's context is to "the First Section" as enacted. In the speech itself, it was
to the first section as it came from the Senate, but shorn of its first sentence.
Bingham, who had just been urging the elimination of the civil rights provision in
that first sentence, read the section to the House without it, and immediately there-
after declared himself as quoted. "I say, with all my heart that that should be the
law of every State," he said with all his heart. GLOBE 1291. This is a poor founda-
tion for the theory Mr. Graham erects on it. Mr. Graham ignores the form in
which the bill came from the Senate, Bingham's motion, the rest of Bingham's
remarks, and what happened to the bill.
Messrs. John P. Frank and Robert F. Munro state that Bingham "opposed the
Civil Rights Act solely because he thought it should await passage of the Four-
teenth Amendment," and attribute to him also the opinion that "appropriate
language should eliminate 'all discrimination between citizens on account of race
or color in civil rights.1" Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal
Protection of the Laws," 5o CoLum. L. Rxv. 131, 142 n.51 (195o). The brief
quotation used by Messrs. Frank and Munro is from the next to last paragraph
of Bingham's speech, quoted and discussed in the text above. He does not in that
passage in so many words express the opinion attributed to him, nor does he do
so anywhere else, and in light of the full text of his speech and of his motion, it is
doubtful that he held it.
Mr. Charles Fairman understands Bingham to have believed that his motion
to recommit with instructions to strike the guarantee of civil rights in section i
and to change the enforcement provision would, if adopted, have cured the bill's
constitutional defect. Fairman, supra note 13, at 39-40. This was Delano's view
and Wilson accused Bingham of holding it. Wilson must have made the same
accusation in the cloakroom as well, for, as shown in the text, Bingham started
right off by entering a disclaimer. His remarks calling for a constitutional amend-
ment to embody that part of section x which he did not hesitate to say he ap-
proved reinforce the point.
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it was in order for him to accept Bingham's motion to recommit
with instructions. He was told that he could do so only by unani-
mous consent. "Mr. Stevens and others objected." Bingham's
motion was then defeated by a large majority. But the House
voted to recommit the bill without instructions. This vote was
close: 82-70. Bingham, of course, voted to recommit. So did
the Democrats; also Raymond, Delano, and Thomas T. Davis
of New York, a Republican who shared Raymond's view. So did
a good many Radicals such as Justin Morrill of Vermont, mem-
ber of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, and even one of
the leaders of the House, Robert C. Schenck of Ohio. Thaddeus
Stevens voted against and Wilson followed him, as did most Radi-
cals.55
Wilson brought the bill back four days later, on March 13. He
reported a committee amendment striking from section x the civil
rights provision Bingham had objected to. Wilson said:
Mr. Speaker, the amendment which has just been read pro-
poses to strike out the general terms relating to civil rights. I do
not think it materially changes the bill; but some gentlemen were
apprehensive that the words we propose to strike out might give
warrant for a latitudinarian construction not intended.
The House concurred by voice vote. Wilson noted, in response to
a question, that the bill as it now stood contained no proviso ex-
cluding suffrage from its application; but he thought the com-
mittee amendment just reported should take care of any appre-
hensions on that score. He then pressed for a vote. Bingham and
others asked that the bill be printed and allowed to lay over so
gentlemen could read it again. Wilson would not give in, however,
and the vote was taken. The majority for passage was large.
Bingham and five other Republicans were recorded against. Ray-
mond and a few others did not vote. 6
Two days later the Senate concurred in the House amend-
ments.5 7 The President vetoed the bill on March 2 7. In discussing
section i, he conceded that the only rights safeguarded by it were
those enumerated. He did not attack the section on the basis of
any alarmist "latitudinarian" construction. His objections were
-- GLOBE 1296.
56 GLOBE 1366-67.
.5 But not without hearing one more violent speech by Garrett Davis, Ken-
tucky's furious Democrat. GLOBE 1413-16; see note 36 supra.
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constitutional.1 The Senate took up the veto on April 4, having
had a recess on account of the death of Senator Solomon Foot of
Vermont. There were speeches by Trumbull, Reverdy Johnson,
Cowan, and Garrett Davis, Democrat of Kentucky, who was still
maintaining that the bill would abolish antimiscegenation statutes
and mark the end of segregation in hotels and railroad cars and
churches. Finally the Senate overrode the veto, five Republicans
voting to uphold. 9 On April 9 the House also overrode, without
debate. Seven Republicans, including Henry J. Raymond, voted
to uphold the President. Bingham was paired in support of the
veto.60
The Bingham Amendment
While the Senate was passing the Freedmen's Bureau and Civil
Rights Bills, but before the President had vetoed the former and
before the House had taken up the latter, the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction 61 worked out and reported a proposed constitu-
tional amendment dealing with the "privileges and immunities of
58 GLOBE 1679-81.
59 GLOBE i775-8o, z782-85, i8o9; GLOBE, App. 181-85.
10 GLOBE I86I.
" The Committee, known popularly as the Committee of Fifteen, came into
being under the Joint Resolution of December i3, 1565. GLOBE 6, 30, 46-47. The
father of the Committee was Thaddeus Stevens, one of the most powerful con-
gressional leaders in our history, who, if he were making headlines today, would
doubtless be billed in them as "Mr. Radical." Stevens possessed, as he once under-
stated it to the House, "some will of my own," and he was at no time animated
by a desire to compromise with the new President. Conservatives and Moderates
in his party were. But not Stevens. He would either rule the President or fight
him. He conceived of the Joint Committee as a sort of Politburo, governing the
South with, or without, or against the President. KEND~iCx, Tm JOURNAL oF THE
JOINT CommIT E or FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 133-54 (1914); HEmY, Op. Cit.
supra note 25, at 133-42. But, as its journal shows, the Committee was never
entirely Stevens' creature.
The resolution creating the Committee was a veiled reflection of Stevens' pur-
pose. It struck the dominant political note which, on the whole, was to charac-
terize the work of the session. And it was to some extent a poor forecast of the
business with which the Committee was to deal. It instructed the Committee to
"inquire into the condition of the States which formed the so-called confederate
States of America, and report whether they, or any of them, are entitled to be
represented in either House of Congress, with leave to report at any time, by bill
or otherwise." There were nine members from the House and six from the Senate,
three of the total being Democrats: Representatives Stevens, Washburne of Illinois,
Morrill of Vermont, Bingham, Conkling of New York, Boutwell of Massachusetts,
and Blow of Missouri, Republicans, and Grider of Kentucky and Rogers, Demo-
crats; Senators Fessenden of Maine, Grimes of Iowa, Harris of New York, Howard
of Michigan, and Williams of Oregon, 'Republicans, and Reverdy Johnson,
Democrat.
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citizens" and with "equal protection." The principal author of this
proposal, and its manager in debate, was John A. Bingham of
Ohio.
The Joint Committee convened on January 6, i866, and dis-
cussed the basis upon which the former Confederate states might
again be given representation in the federal government, and the
related question of negro suffrage. At the third meeting, on Janu-
ary 12, a subcommittee was appointed and charged with report-
ing on the basis of representation. It consisted of William Pitt
Fessenden, the Moderate Senator from Maine, Thaddeus Stevens,
Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan, a Radical, Roscoe Conkling
of New York, then in the House, who generally acted with the
leadership but was not a doctrinaire Radical, and Bingham. Into
the hopper of the Subcommittee went the following draft, pro-
posed by Bingham as an amendment to the Constitution:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary and
proper to secure to all persons in every state within this Union
equal protection in their rights of life, liberty and property.
Stevens, in addition to a proposal on the basis of representation,
submitted the following:
All laws, state and national, shall operate impartially and equally
on all persons without regard to race or color.
On January 2o, Fessenden, reporting to the full Committee
from the Subcommittee, brought forth three proposed articles of
amendment to the Constitution,
the first two as alternative propositions, one of which, with the
third proposition, to be recommended to Congress for adoption:
Article A.
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States within this Union, according to the respective num-
bers of citizens of the United States in each State; and all provi-
sions in the Constitution or laws of any State, whereby any dis-
tinction is made in political or civil rights or privileges, on account
of race, creed or color, shall be inoperative and void.
Or the following:
Article B.
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among
the several States which may be included within this Union, accord-
[Vol. 6 9
HeinOnline  -- 69 Harv. L. Rev.  30 1955-1956
THE SEGREGATION DECISION
ing to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of citi-
zens of the United States in each State; provided that, whenever
the elective franchise shall be denied or abridged in any State on
account of race, creed or color, all persons of such race, creed or
color, shall be excluded from the basis of representation.
Article C.
Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary and proper
to secure to all citizens of the United States, in every State, the
same political rights and privileges; and to all persons in every
State equal protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and prop-
erty.
As is apparent, the combination of articles A and C amounted
to an immediate grant of negro suffrage, while that of articles B
and C was a prospective grant, to be realized when and if Con-
gress felt so inclined, probably later than sooner, since an interim
scheme was provided. As regards other rights, article A again
acted directly and immediately, but negatively, on the states, with
a reserve implementing power being lodged in Congress by article
C, whereas article B made no provision but rather left the whole
matter to Congress through article C. Articles A and C differed
in that the latter struck at discriminations, in suffrage and other
rights, whether or not based on color; that is, article C covered all
classes of "citizens" and "persons," whereas article A did not. As
regards the extent of the rights protected, the two articles were
coterminous in the matter of suffrage , both using the words, "po-
litical rights and [or] privileges." But were they intended to be
otherwise coterminous also? That is to say, in the view of the
Subcommittee, did the power to protect the enjoyment of "life,
liberty and property" granted by article C go the same length as
the prohibition of distinctions in "civil rights or privileges" writ-
ten into article A? If so, the Subcommittee's draftsmanship was,
of course, terrible. This is not conclusive against the hypothesis,
but it gives pause. Moreover, reasoning from the position Bing-
ham, the author of the "life, liberty and property" language,
took on the Civil Rights Bill, it is fair to conclude that he for one
saw a difference between the term "civil rights" and his own for-
mula. On the assumption that the Subcommittee understood civil
rights protection to reach further than the Bingham proposal,
articles A and C taken together reveal a rational purpose rather
than monumentally bad draftsmanship, the purpose being to
strike broadly and immediately at discriminations based on color,
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leaving to Congress the less urgent problem of other unequal
laws, and at the same time to make the affirmative function
of Congress to take over legislative powers hitherto reserved to
the states narrower than a negative provision, limiting state
power, but substituting no other. Again, comparing the two
packages, one would expect the proposal which went the whole
way on suffrage to protect a greater range of other rights, and the
one which embodied the more conservative approach to the suf-
frage question to be satisfied with the grant of narrower- and
prospective -additional protection. On this hypothesis, the al-
ternative proposals presented the full Committee with a real choice
all the way down the line.
It is more than likely that Thaddeus Stevens personally favored
the alternative which included article A. But the old gentleman
was a confirmed practitioner of the art of the possible. And so he
moved that article C be severed from the other two, and then that
article B be considered in preference to article A. This was done.
Article B, with minor changes, was reported out as the Commit-
tee's first product. It was doomed to defeat, largely because it was
unacceptable to Charles Sumner, who was at this time unable to
abandon the principle of immediate suffrage, though he eventually
saw the light.02
At the Committee's next meeting, on January 24, article C was
tackled. A couple of unsuccessful attempts were made to tinker
with the provision concerning political rights. Finally, by a vote
of 7 to 5, it was decided to refer the proposal to a select committee
consisting of Bingham, Representative George S. Boutwell of
Massachusetts, a Radical, and Andrew Jackson Rogers, for re-
drafting. Three days later, Bingham reported it back in this form:
Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be neces-
sary and proper to secure all persons in every state full protection
in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property; and to all citizenfs
of the United States in any State the same immunities and also
equal political rights and privileges.
The two parts of the article had been turned around; equal pro-
02 The idea embodied in article B had been first suggested by James G. Blaine
of Maine. GLOBE 136, 141-42. The House passed the proposal as reported by
Stevens from the Joint Committee. GLOBE 538. Sumner attacked it heavily in
the Senate, GLOBE 673-87, 1224-32, 1281-82, and the addition of his vote, and the
votes of one or two other Radicals, to those of the Democrats and Conservative
Republicans ensured its defeat there. GLOBE 1289.
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tection had become full; the same political rights had become
equal; and the word "immunities" appears for the first time.
These would seem to be largely matters of style, though it may be
remarked that "full" is presumably something different than
"equal." Stevens tried to get this proposal reported out, but could
not do it. Four Republicans were absent and three voted nay.
When consideration was resumed on February 3, Bingham pro-
posed the following substitute:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States (Art. 4,
Sec. 2); and to all persons in the several States equal protection in
the rights of life, liberty and property (5th Amendment).
Protection in this draft had reverted back to "equal." The more
notable change, however, is the elimination of any reference to
political rights. The substitution was agreed to by a vote of 7 to 6,
Stevens and Fessenden voting against. On February 1O it was de-
cided, 9 to 5, to report this proposal out. Senator Ira Harris of
New York, an inconspicuous Moderate, and Conkling were the
only Republicans who voted nay.63
Debate began in the House on February 26. Bingham in a brief
opening aired the notion indicated by the parenthetical references
to the Constitution. He said:
Every word of the proposed amendment is to-day in the Consti-
tution of our country, save the words conferring the express grant
of power upon the Congress of the United States.
Sir, it has been the want of the Republic that there was not an
express grant of power in the Constitution to enable the whole
people of every State, by congressional enactment, to enforce obedi-
ence to these requirements of the Constitution.64
A number of Radicals who spoke in support of Bingham also gave
vent to the idea that the proposal was in some way declarative,
merely enabling Congress to enforce rights already guaranteed by
the Constitution as it stood." William D. "Pig-Iron" Kelley of
63 KxEDiucx, op. cit. supra note 6i, at 39, 45-47, 50-53, 55-58, 6x-63. These
citations cover the entire course of the Committee's deliberations so far described
in the text.
6" GLOBE 1034.
5 Thus William Higby of California thought the amendment would simply
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Pennsylvania even expressed the opinion that the amendment
would add no new powers whatever to those Congress already pos-
sessed, though he recognized that reasonable men might have
doubts on this score which it was worthwhile to remove. Kelley
at the same time appeared to think that the proposal dealt with
suffrage."° Aside from him, however, and from Bingham, later,
when he was responding to attacks, the supporters of the amend-
ment had little if anything specific to say about the kind of state
action to which it was directed. This contrasts with the speeches
made in behalf of the Civil Rights Bill. The opposition was bi-
partisan, as in the case of the Senate draft of the Civil Rights Bill,
and it was to prove effective.
For the Democrats, Rogers, having noted that the need which
Bingham professed for his amendment proved that the Civil
Rights Bill - then about to come up in the House - was uncon-
stitutional, addressed himself to the equal protection clause. He
for one evidently saw no difference between this formula and the
comprehensive civil rights provision in the Senate draft of the
Civil Rights Bill. Under this clause, he said,
Congress can pass . . .a law compelling South Carolina to grant
to negroes every right accorded to white people there; and as
white men there have the right to marry white women, negroes,
under this amendment, would be entitled to the same right ....
Further:
In the State of Pennsylvania there are laws which make a dis-
tinction with regard to the schooling of white children and the
schooling of black children. . . .Under this amendment, Congress
would have power to compel the State to provide for white children
and black children to attend the same school, upon the principle
that all the people in the several States shall have equal protection
in all the rights of life, liberty, and property, and all the privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States.
Sir, I defy any man upon the other side of the House to name to
me any right of the citizen which is not included in the words "life,
give effect to parts of the Constitution which "probably were intended from the
beginning to have life and vitality .... ." GLoBE 1054. Frederick E. Woodbridge of
Vermont said the amendment would enable Congress to "give to a citizen of the
United States, in whatever State he may be, those privileges and immunities which
are guarantied to him under the constitution .... ." GLOBE 1o88.
es GLOBE io57, I062-63.
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liberty, property, privileges, and immunities," unless it should be
the right of suffrage .... 67
The speech which was very likely decisive against the Bingham
amendment was delivered by Robert S. Hale of New York, a
lawyer and former judge, and a man who was able to make the
House sit up and listen. Hale was a regular Republican. Though
he was to be recorded absent for the vote on passage of the Civil
Rights Bill, he was to vote to override the veto of that bill, and
eventually for the fourteenth amendment. This proposal seemed
to him, however, to entrust Congress with the most extraordinary
powers. To begin with, Hale paid his respects to Bingham:
Listening to the remarks of the distinguished member of the com-
mittee who reported this joint resolution to the House, one would
be led to think that this amendment was a subject of the most
trivial consequence. He tells us, and tells us with an air of gravity
that I could not but admire, that the words of the resolution are
all in the Constitution as it stands, with the single exception of the
power given to Congress to legislate. A very important exception,
it strikes me ....
What is the effect of the amendment . . . ? I submit that it is
in effect a provision under which all State legislation, in its codes
of civil and criminal jurisprudence and procedure, affecting the in-
dividual citizen, may be overridden . . . and the law of Congress
established instead.
This roused Thaddeus Sfevens. He asked:
Does the gentleman mean to say that, under this provision, Con-
gress could interfere in any case where the legislation of a State
was equal, impartial to all? Or is it not simply to provide that,
where any State makes a distinction in the same law between dif-
ferent classes of individuals, Congress shall have power to correct
such discrimination and inequality?
The first proposition stated by Stevens was, of course, what Hale
67 GLOBE, App. 133, 134, 135. Much of the rest of Rogers' time was taken up
with the kind of political small talk - the Radicals loved to bait him- into which
so many of his speeches were wont to degenerate. This, of course, cannot but de-
tract from the weight of his remarks. Thus, Samuel J. Randall, Democrat of
Pennsylvania and a future Speaker of the House, felt constrained, after Rogers had
finished, to state: "I wish it to be understood that the gentleman from New Jersey
does not speak for me." The House reacted with laughter. Rogers modestly said,
"I speak for myself." GLOBE 1034; cf. note 44 supra.
1955]
HeinOnline  -- 69 Harv. L. Rev.  35 1955-1956
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
had meant, and he said so. This was much more than just a "pro-
vision for the equality of individual citizens before the laws of
the several States." Moreover, it was important to realize the
reach of this language. For example, said Hale, all states distin-
guished between the property rights of married women on the one
hand, and of "femmes sole" and men on the other. Such distinc-
tions would be outlawed by this proposal. No, said Stevens, pro-
pounding a theory of reasonable classification under the equal
protection clause:
When a distinction is made between two married people or two
femmes sole, then it is unequal legislation; but where all of the
same class are dealt with in the same way then there is no pre-
tense of inequality.
Hale disagreed. The proposal, he said, "gives to all persons equal
protection." If what Stevens had said were the correct construc-
tion it would be sufficient also to extend the same rights to one
Negro as to another in order to satisfy the amendment. There was
no further reply from Stevens. Hale next drew Bingham's fire.
The latter put up to him the fact that property rights and proce-
dural rights in courts of law had been denied by some states.
(Here at last we return to the Black Codes.) Was not some pro-
tection needed? This was weak ground for Hale. The states
should provide it, he said, and if Bingham found that the state of
Ohio could not protect its citizens, he ought to come to New York,
where things were different. Bingham pursued the matter:
I do not cast any imputation upon the State of New York. The
gentleman knows full well, from conversations I have had with him,
that so far as I understand this power, under no possible inter-
pretation can it ever be made to operate in the State of New York
while she occupies her present proud position.
... . It is to apply to other States [than those which seceded]
. . . that have in their constitutions and laws to-day provisions in
direct violation of every principle of our Constitution.
Mr. Rogers. I suppose the gentleman refers to the State of
Indiana?
Mr. Bingham. I do not know; it may be so. It applies unques-
tionably to the State of Oregon. 68
This is an interesting passage. Bingham here specified state
88 GLOBE 1o63-6g.
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enactments which his proposal would strike down. He refused to
commit himself on Indiana. The reference there, as Professor
Fairman has pointed out, was probably to the provision of the
Indiana constitution denying suffrage to Negroes and mulattoes.6 9
His own state, as Bingham remarked in the Civil Rights Bill de-
bate, made a similar discrimination. The Oregon constitution at
this time, as has also been pointed out, forbade free Negroes or
mulattoes not residing in the state at the time of its adoption to
come into the state, reside there, hold real estate, contract, or
sue.70 This sort of thing Bingham wanted to strike down. As for
the State of New York in her then proud position, whether or not
Bingham knew it, her laws permitted the establishment of sepa-
rate but equal schools for colored children in the discretion of
local districts. Segregated schools in fact existed at least until the
year I9oo. And it seems quite possible, on the face of her statutes,
that New York maintained her proud position in respect of per-
missive segregation in rural districts till 1938.71
" IND. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 5 (1851); see Fairman, supra note 13, at 31 n.57.
7ORE. CON ST. art. I, § 35 (1857); see Fairman, supra note 13, at 32 n.58;
Boudin, supra note 13, at 35 n.i3.
7 N.Y. Sess. Laws E864, C. 555, tit. io, provided: "Section z. The school
authorities of any city or incorporated village ...may, when they shall deem it
expedient, establish a separate school or separate schools for the instruction of
children and youth of African descent, resident therein ... and such school or
schools shall be supported in the same manner and to the same extent as the
school or schools supported therein for white children, and they shall be subject
to the same rules and regulations, and be furnished with facilities for instruction
equal to those furnished to the white schools therein.
"Section 2. The trustees of any union school district, or of any school district
organized under a special act, may, when the inhabitants of any such district shall
so determine ... establish ... separate schools for the instruction of such col-
ored children ...and such schools shall be supported in the same manner, and
receive the same care, and be furnished with the same facilities for instruction as
the white schools therein."
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1894, c. 556, tit. 15, art. ii, §§ 28, 29, reenacted the two sec-
tions of the 1864 statute quoted above. In igoo, segregation in Queens was upheld
in People ex tel. Cisco v. School Bd., z6z N.Y. 598, 56 N.E. 81. Following this
decision, the legislature passed an act "to secure equal rights to colored children."
It did so by providing that "no person shall be refused admission into or be
excluded from any public school in the state of New York on account of race
or color," and by repealing § 28 of the Act of 1894 (§ z of the Act of 1864),
which permitted segregation in cities and incorporated villages. But it left un-
disturbed § 29 of the same Act of 1894 (§ 2 of the Act of 1864), which was the
corresponding provision applicable to union school districts and districts organized
under special acts, and which differed in that it permitted segregation only after
a vote by the district's inhabitants. N.Y. Sess. Laws igoo, c. 492.
One hesitates to pass judgment with any feeling of confidence on this state of
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The next day, Thomas T. Davis, another New York Repub-
lican, took up where Hale had left off. He, too, thought that this
was an extraordinary grant of power to Congress, and he feared
that the power would be used "in the establishment of perfect po-
litical equality between the colored and the white race of the
South." The Negroes, he said,
must be made equal before the law, and be permitted to enjoy life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. I am pledged to my own con-
science to favor every measure of legislation which shall be found
essential to the protection of their just rights [Davis was to vote
for the Civil Rights Bill], and shall most cheerfully aid in any plan
for their education and elevation which may reasonably be adopted.
Give them protection, teachers, education, and hold out to them
inducements to self-improvement ....
But this amendment meant "centralization of power in Congress"
and very likely political rights - and that was going too far.72
The proposal was clearly in trouble, and Bingham, in a long
speech, attempted a rescue operation. Among other things, he
said:
The proposition pending before the House is simply a proposition
to arm the Congress . . . with the power to enforce the bill of
rights as it stands in the Constitution today. It "hath that extent
- no more."
the New York law. But the legislative action of 9oo cannot simply be attributed
to an oversight. In the face of this partial repealer, would the declaration that no
person should be refused admission to "any school" on account of color have been
given effect in school districts to which the unrepealed § 29 was applicable? It is
noteworthy that while all of the Act of 1864 was on the books, the legislature
passed a civil rights act prohibiting trustees and other officers of "public institu-
tions of learning" from excluding anyone on account of color "from full and equal
enjoyment of any accommodation, advantage, facility or privilege." N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1873, c. i86, § i. Nevertheless, the New York Court of Appeals had no
difficulty avoiding this statute and upholding school segregation in Brooklyn as
provided for in the Act of 1864. People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438,
455-56 (1883). Perhaps by 9oo segregation outside cities and incorporated villages
was not a problem. Perhaps it never had been much of one. Yet here was a section
dealing with it, and there just is no satisfactory explanation for what looks like a
deliberate failure to repeal it. But cf. Sutherland, Segregation by Race in Public
Schools Retrospect and Prospect, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 169, 171 (1955). The
section was at last stricken from the books by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1938, c. 134.
72 GLOBE i085, IO87.
[Vol. 69
HeinOnline  -- 69 Harv. L. Rev.  38 1955-1956
THE SEGREGATION DECISION
.... [R]equirements of our Constitution have been broken;
they are disregarded to-day in Oregon; they are disregarded to-day,
and have been disregarded for the last five, ten, or twenty years in
every one of the eleven States recently in insurrection.
S. .. Gentlemen who oppose this amendment oppose the grant
of power to enforce the bill of rights. Gentlemen who oppose this
amendment simply declare to these rebel States, go on with your
confiscation statutes, your statutes of banishment, your statutes of
unjust imprisonment, your statutes of murder and death against
men because of their loyalty to . . . the United States53
Bingham, though with singular lack of clarity, was suggesting
to those of the members who were alarmed that he had some defi-
nite evils in mind, limited and distinct in their nature. His perora-
tion pulled out all stops in an appeal to due process, "law in its
highest sense." 7" But the assurances, the magic of somewhat
windy eloquence, and even a political rallying cry, which Bingham
also employed - all failed. Hale's argument had sunk in and was
going to prevail. Bingham was followed by another New Yorker,
Giles W. Hotchkiss, a Radical, who read the proposal as had his
colleague Hale, and who, according to his own lights, also feared
"the caprice" of future Congresses:
As I understand it, . . . [Bingham's] object in offering this resolu-
tion . . . is to provide that no State shall discriminate between its
citizens and give one class of citizens greater rights than it confers
upon another. If this amendment secured that, I should vote very
cheerfully for it to-day; but . . . I do not regard it as perma-
nently securing those rights . ...
I am unwilling that Congress shall have [the] power [this
amendment confers]. . . . The object of a Constitution is not only
to confer power upon the majority, but to restrict the power of the
majority . . . It is not indulging in imagination to any great
stretch to suppose that we may have a Congress here who would
establish such rules in my State as I should be unwilling to Be gov-
erned by.
Mr. Speaker, I make these remarks because I do not wish to be
placed in the wrong upon this question. I think the gentleman from
Ohio [Mr. Bingham] is not sufficiently radical in his views upon
7 GLOBE 1o88, io9O-91.
7' GLOBE 1094.
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this subject. I think he is a conservative. [Laughter.] I do not
make the remark in any offensive sense. But I want him to go to
the root of this matter.
... . Why not provide by an amendment to the Constitution
that no State shall discriminate against any class of its citizens;
and let that amendment stand as part of the organic law of the
land, subject only to be defeated by another . . .
Roscoe Conkling, who had voted against reporting this proposal
out of the Joint Committee, was quick to point out that he was
against it for reasons "very different . . . from, if not entirely
opposite to" those given by Hotchkiss. Conkling certainly thought
the proposal went far enough and was sufficiently radical. He
moved to postpone consideration of it to a day certain, the second
Tuesday of April. A vote was first taken on a Democratic motion
to postpone indefinitely. This was defeated by a party line-up,
with, however, somewhat more than normal defections. Thus
Davis and Hale voted with the Democrats. The Conkling motion,
taken up next, carried 110-37. The Republican leadership was
solidly behind it. Bingham himself voted for it. Six Republicans
voted consistently against any kind of postponement- Demo-
cratic or Republican. Davis decided that if he could not have
indefinite postponement, he wanted none, no doubt expressing the
judgment, indicated also by the position of the leadership, that the
proposal could be beaten then and there. The date of this vote
was February 28.76 The second Tuesday in April came and went
with no further mention of the Bingham amendment. It was never
brought up in the Senate, nor ever again in the House.
The Fourteenth Amendment
Having reported out Bingham's draft, the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction did not resume consideration of proposed consti-
tutional amendments till April 16. On that day the Committee
heard Senator Stewart, Republican of Nevada, expound a recon-
struction plan which he and other Moderates had hoped might yet
75 GLOBE Io95.
76 Ibid.
77 The Committee considered a measure for the readmission of Tennessee, which
was controlled by anti-Johnson forces and had a special claim to Radical favor.
For over a month, it did not meet. Subcommittees, however, were taking evidence
on conditions in the South. KINDwacx, op. cit. supra note 61, at 63-81, 221-27.
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provide a basis for peaceful coexistence between the Radicals and
the President. The Stewart plan turned on a constitutional amend-
ment granting equal "civil rights" to Negroes, as well as limited
suffrage. The South was offered, among other things, an amnesty
and the power to restrict negro suffrage so long as it did so without
using race as a sole or explicit criterion.7 Stewart and his hopes
got a hearing, but nothing more, from the Joint Committee. At its
next meeting on April 2 1,
Mr. Stevens said he had a plan of reconstruction, one not of his
own framing, but which he should support, and which he submitted
to the Committee for consideration.
It was read as follows:
Whereas, It is expedient that the States lately in insurrection
should . . . be restored to full participation in all political rights;
therefore,
Be it resolved . . . that the following Article be proposed
as an amendment to the Constitution . . .
Article -
Section i. No discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by
the United States, as to civil rights of persons because of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.
Sec. 2. From and after the fourth day of July, in the year one
thousand eight hundred and seventy-six, no discrimination shall
be made by any state, nor by the United States, as to the enjoy-
ment . . . of the right of suffrage ....
Sec. 3. [Excluded all persons who were denied suffrage from the
basis of representation, till 1876.]
Sec. 4. [Confederate debt and compensation for slaves.]
Sec. 5. Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
And be it further resolved, [former Confederate states which
ratified this amendment and enacted legislation in compliance with
it, to be readmitted to the Union, when ratification of the amend-
ment was complete.]
Provided, [that certain "rebels" be excluded from office till
1876.]
79
7 8 Id. at 82, 252-55. Section i of Stewart's proposed amendment read: "All
discriminations among the people because of race, color or previous condition of
servitude, either in civil rights or the right of suffrage, are prohibited; but the
States may exempt persons now voters from restrictions on suffrage hereafter
imposed." GLOBE i9o6.
79 I NRxcx, op. cit. supra note 61, 83-84.
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As Stevens said, this proposal was not his own. It had been
placed before him in March by Robert Dale Owen, reformer son
of a reformer father. Owen, some nine years later, described his
meeting with Stevens. The latter objected to prospective suffrage,
as provided in section 2. This was a frank recognition, said Owen,
of the fact that the Negro was not yet ready to vote or hold office.
"I hate to delay full justice so long," said Stevens. But suffrage
was not now the Negro's immediate need, the younger man an-
swered. "He thirsts after education, and will have it if we but give
him a chance, and if we don't call him away from the school-room
to take a seat which he is unfitted to fill in a legislative chamber."
Stevens then made a quick decision in favor of the proposal. He
said there was not a majority for immediate suffrage, and this
could pass. Owen, as he recalled, also took his amendment around
to other members of the Joint Committee. Fessenden; Represent-
ative Elihu Washburne of Illinois, Grant's friend, who was briefly
to be his Secretary of State; Roscoe Conkling; Senator 'Jacob
-Howard of Michigan and Representative George S. Boutwell of
Massachusetts, two Radicals - all approved with various degrees
of enthusiasm, though none with the decisiveness of Stevens. "So,
qualifiedly [these are Owen's words], did Bingham, observing,
however, that he thought the first section ought to specify, in de-
tail, the civil rights which we proposed to assure; he had a favorite
section of his own on that subject." 8'
The Committee went at the Owen proposal section by section.
Bingham moved that section i be amended by adding the follow-
ing:
nor shall any state deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws, nor take private property for public
use without just compensation.
This motion was lost, 7 to 5. Stevens voted with Bingham. So
did Rogers and Reverdy Johnson, though not Grider, the other
Democrat. The Committee then voted io to 2 (Grider and
Rogers) to adopt section i as it stood. Sections 2, 3, and 4 were
also adopted. When the Committee reached section 5, Bingham
moved the following as a substitute:
Sec. 5. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
80 Owen, Political Results From the Varioloid, 35 ATLANTIC MO THLY 66o, 662-
64 (1875).
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nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.
This is, of course, language which now appears unchanged in the
fourteenth amendment. The Committee adopted it, 10 to 2 (Grider
and Rogers). Section 5 of the original proposal was renumbered
and also accepted. Throughout this meeting Fessenden and Conk-
ling as well as Senator Ira Harris of New York were absent.
Two days later, the Committee, Fessenden still absent, modified
the final provisions of the proposal following the numbered arti-
cles, which it severed, intending to report them out separately. At
the next meeting, on April 25, Senator George H. Williams of
Oregon, a Radical, moved to strike section 5, that is, the substitute
which Bingham had got accepted at the meeting before last. Wil-
liams had voted for the substitution. His present motion carried,
7 to 5. Stevens was with Bingham in opposition. So was Rogers,
who had voted with Bingham for equal protection language in
section i, a vote Bingham had lost, but against the substitution
of the section he was now supporting. So far Rogers favored equal
protection only as a losing cause. Harris, Howard, Johnson, Wil-
liams, Grider, Conkling, and Boutwell voted to strike the section.
Fessenden was still absent. The Committee then voted, 7 to 6, to
report the entire package. Conkling, Boutwell, and Representa-
tive Henry T. Blow of Missouri were the Republicans voting nay.
Bingham, nothing daunted, promptly moved the adoption of his
deleted section 5 as a separate proposed amendment to the Con-
stitution. He was again defeated, 8 to 4, even Stevens leaving him
on this one. The three Democrats were with Bingham. Williams
then moved that the vote to report out the package be reconsid-
ered. This carried 1o to 2, the only nays being Howard and
Stevens. With that the Committee adjourned.
The Committee was in session again on April 28, three days
later, with Fessenden now present. This time the entire proposal
was reported out, but with' major changes. Instead of granting
suffrage prospectively, it was now decided to write a new section
2, simply eliminating from the basis of representation persons to
whom the vote was denied, and a new section 3 disenfranchising,
for purposes of federal elections, large numbers of Southerners till
the year 187o. That done, Bingham, still trying, moved to sub-
stitute for section i (the civil rights section) his privileges and
immunities, due process, and equal protection language, which
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had once been substituted for section 5 and then been struck.
This motion carried io to 3. All three Democrats voted for it, as
did Stevens and Roscoe Conkling. The opposition consisted of
Howard and Representative Justin Morrill of Vermont, both stout
Radicals, and Senator James W. Grimes of Iowa, a moderate Re-
publican of the Fessenden sort. Fessenden himself and Harris
abstained. On the vote to report the resulting amendment out,
only three Democrats were opposed. The Committee alsb reported
a bill readmitting, upon the ratification of the amendment, states
which had voted to ratify it, and a bill excluding from office certain
Confederate officials.
8 '
One of the puzzles to which this course of events in the Joint
Committee gives rise is solved by the recollections of Robert Dale
Owen. As Thaddeus Stevens told Owen, it was Fessenden's ab-
sence at the meetings of April 21, 23, and 25 which caused the
Committee not to report out the draft it had approved, including
a civil rights provision in section i and a grant of prospective suf-
frage in section 2, and excluding Bingham's formula. Fessenden,
who was sick of the varioloid, a mild and euphonious form of
smallpox which no longer distracts our politics, was chairman of
the Committee on the part of the Senate. It seemed to most mem-
bers (but not to Stevens and Howard, as we have seen) a lack of
courtesy to report out the Committee's most important and final
product in his absence. Hence the decision to do so was left in
abeyance for three days. That gave a chance to the New York,
Illinois, and Indiana congressional delegations to caucus and to
decide that it was politically inadvisable to go to the country in
1866 on a platform having anything to do with negro suffrage,
immediate or prospective. On that issue, these delegations felt,
the Republicans might lose the election. This view was commu-
nicated to the Committee. As a result, when it met again, the Com-
mittee fell to rewriting section 2.2 Why it proceeded to redo sec-
tion i as well, Owen was, however, unable to explain. Nor did he
explain the on-again-off-again attitude toward the Bingham for-
mula.
Section i, as originally proposed by Owen and Stevens, was
framed in terms of the sentence the House had struck from the
Civil Rights Bill to avoid a "latitudinarian" construction. The
language Bingham at first proposed to add to section i had two
11 K NDRicx, op. cit. supra note 61, at 85-120.
12 Owen, supra note so, at 665-66.
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apparent effects: it protected, as his own defeated amendment had
done, against discriminations other than just those based on color,
and it added a special property safeguard not dependent on dis-
crimination. As regards negro rights, there is no internal indica-
tion whether the "equal protection of the laws" formula (nota
bene - "of the laws," not "in the rights of life, liberty and prop-,
erty," as in the earlier Bingham amendment) was thought by the
Committee to imply greater or lesser coverage than the term "civil
rights." In either event, it must have been realized that the two
provisions overlapped. Yet Bingham at first seemed to want both
in, and the Committee, when at one point it accepted Bingham's
substitute for section 5, might seem to have been prepared to sub-
mit them together. The answer to this oddity may lie in the me-
chanics of committee drafting. Inconsistencies, redundancies, and
the vestiges of tactical maneuvers appear at some stages and re-
main to be combed out later. The Committee never actually gave
final approval to both the civil rights provision and the Bingham
proposal as parts of the same measure.
On April 30, 1866, Fessenden in the Senate and Stevens in the
House introduced the Committee draft. They both announced that
a report as well as testimony taken before the Committee would
soon be printed and distributed."3 Debate started in the House
first, on May 8, under a thirty-minute rule .4 Stevens opened.
The founders, he said, had not been able to build on the uncom-
promising foundation of the Declaration of Independence. They
had decided to wait for "a more propitious time. That time ought
to be present now." Now should have been the time to build
"upon the firm foundation of eternal justice." But "the pub-
lic mind has been educated in error for a century. How difficult in
a day to unlearn it." The new constitutional structure the Com-
mittee was erecting, Stevens said, was defective still, but it made
it possible to "trust to the advancing progress of a higher morality
and a purer and more intelligent principle . . . ." The proposi-
tion "falls far short of my wishes, but it fulfills my hopes. I be-
lieve it is all that can be obtained in the present state of public
opinion. . . . I will take all I can get in the cause of humanity and
leave it to be perfected by better men in better times. It may be
that that time will not come while I am here to enjoy the glorious
83 GLOBE 2265, 2286.
84 GLOBE 2433-34.
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triumph; but that it will come is as certain as that there is a just
God."
In all probability, the disappointment of Thaddeus Stevens cen-
tered on the failure to make any provision for negro suffrage, im-
mediate or prospective. It was for this reason that he had called
the final Committee draft a "shilly-shally, bungling thing" in con-
versation with Robert Dale Owen.85 On the other hand, while he
supported Bingham's formula at various drafting stages in com-
mittee, Stevens had himself proposed language (directed specifi-
cally at racial distinctions) which he might well have regarded as
more sweeping, and which, as he had early had occasion to tell the
House, was "the genuine proposition," "the one I love." 86 And
he spoke his disappointment to the same House now in general
terms. He went on then to "refer to the provisions of the proposed
amendment":
The first section prohibits the States from abridging the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or unlawfully
depriving them of life, liberty, or property, or of denying to any
person within their jurisdiction the "equal" protection of the laws.
I can hardly believe that any person can be found who will not
admit that every one of these provisions is just. They are all as-
serted, in some form or other, in our Declaration or organic law.
But the Constitution limits only the action of Congress, and is not
a limitation on the States. This amendment supplies that defect,
and allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States,
so far that the law which operates upon one man shall operate
equally upon all. Whatever law punishes a white man for a crime
shall punish the black man precisely in the same way . . . . What-
ever law protects the white man shall afford "equal" protection to
the black man. Whatever means of redress is afforded to one shall
be afforded to all. Whatever law allows the white man to testify
in court shall allow the man of color to do the same. These are
great advantages over their present codes. . . . I need not enu-
merate these partial and oppressive laws. Unless the Constitution
should restrain them those States will . . . crush to death the
hated freedmen. Some answer, "Your civil rights bill secures the
same things." That is partly true, but a law is repealable by a
majority.
8
It will be noted that Stevens, in passing, suggested the argument
sOwen, supra note So, at 665.
s6 GLOBE 537. See pp. 30, 41 supra.
17 GLOBE 2499.
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with which Bingham had supported his earlier amendment, that
is, that the provisions now proposed were "asserted" elsewhere in
the Constitution. But he went on to mention evils to which the
proposal was directed, harking back to those which had been
pointed to in support of the Civil Rights Bill. In the debate which
followed, many members were heard from. But only two on either
side of the aisle devoted more than the briefest sort of generality
to section i. These two were Bingham, whose generalities were
not brief, and Rogers, who specified his objections. For the rest,
speakers on both sides identified section i with the Civil Rights
Act. Republicans added, following Stevens' lead, that that great
enactment would now be placed beyond the power of future Con-
gresses to repeal,88 or remarked on the self-evident justice of the
proposal, the better part of which was in the Constitution as it
stood anyway. 9 One or two regretted that suffrage was not con-
ferred 0 Democrats jibed that in bringing forth this proposal the
Radical leadership had admitted the unconstitutionality of the
Civil Rights Act,91 or charged rather vaguely that the Radicals
had far-reaching ultimate aims, including political equality for the
" M. Russell Thayer of Pennsylvania: "As I understand it, it is but incorpo-
rating in the Constitution . . . the principle of the civil rights bill . . . [so that
it] shall be forever incorporated . . . " GLOBE 2465. To the same effect, John M.
Broomall of Pennsylvania, GLOBE 2498, and Thomas D. Eliot of Massachusetts,
GLOBE 25MI. Henry J. Raymond, who was going to vote for this amendment, also
thought the "principle" of this proposal was that embodied in the Civil Rights
Bill, which he had opposed on constitutional grounds. He was further of the
opinion that the same "principle" had been expressed by the Bingham amendment,
concerning which Raymond had been silent and remained so now. GLOBE 2502.
11 William D. Kelley of Pennsylvania: "There is not a man in Montgomery or
Lehigh county [the constituency of a Pennsylvania Democrat, Benjamin M.
Boyer] that will not say those provisions ought to be in the Constitution if they
are not already there." GLOBE 2468. George F. Miller of Pennsylvania: "As to the
first, it is so just ... and so dearly within the spirit of the Declaration of
Independence of the 4 th of July, 1776, that no member of this House can
seriously object to it." GLOBE 2510. John F. Farnsworth of Illinois: "This is so
self-evident and just that no man whose soul is not too cramped and dwarfed to
hold the smallest germ of justice can fail to see and appreciate it." GLOBE 2539.
James A. Garfield, who discussed other parts of the amendment with his usual
acuity, merely referred to "this first section here which proposes to hold over
every American citizen, without regard to color, the protecting shield of law."
GLOBE 2462.
90 E.g., Eliot of Massachusetts, GLOBE 2511; Farnsworth of Illinois, GLOBE 2539.
91 William E. Finck of Ohio: "Well, all I have to say about this section is,
that if it is necessary to adopt it . . . then the civil rights bill ... was passed
without authority, and is dearly unconstitutional." GLOBE 2461. To the same
effect, Charles A. Eldridge of Wisconsin, GLOBE 2506.
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NegroY2 But the bulk of the debate turned on other sections,
principally section 3. A number of the Republicans who spoke
failed even to mention section 1.93
To Andrew Jackson Rogers, who at least in this respect saw
farther than most, section i was the heart of the matter. He said:
Now sir, I have examined these propositions . . . and I have
come to the conclusion different to what some others have come,
that the first section of this programme of disunion is the most
dangerous to liberty. It saps the foundation of the Government
. . . it consolidates everything ....
This section . . . is no more nor less than an attempt to embody
in the Constitution . . . that outrageous and miserable civil rights
bill ....
. . . . What are privileges and immunities? Why, sir, all the
rights we have under the laws of the country are embraced under
the definition of privileges and immunities. The right to vote is
a privilege. The right to marry is a privilege. The right to con-
tract is a privilege. The right to be a juror is a privilege. The right
to be a judge or President of the United States is a privilege. I hold
if that ever becomes a part of the fundamental law of the land it
will prevent any State from refusing to allow anything to anybody
embraced under this term of privileges and immunities. . . . It
will result in a revolution worse than that through which we have
just passed.
Rogers did not deal specifically with the equal protection clause.
He proceeded to attack section 2, which, he said, was intended to
exert indirect pressure on the South to grant negro suffrage. Then f
92 Boyer of Pennsylvania: "The first section embodies the principles of the
civil rights bill, and is intended to secure ultimately, and to some extent indirectly,
the political equality of the negro race. It is objectionable also in its phraseology,
being open to ambiguity and admitting of conflicting constructions." GLOBE 2467.
Samuel J. Randall of Pennsylvania: "The first section proposes to make an
equality in every respect between the two races, notwithstanding the policy of
discrimination which has heretofore been exclusively exercised by the States . ...
If 'you have the right to interfere in behalf of one character of rights- I may say
of every character of rights, save the suffrage -how soon- will you be ready to
tear down every barrier? It is only because you fear the people that you do not
now do it." GLOBE 25,50. See also remarks by George S. Shanklin of Kentucky
and Myer Strouse of Pennsylvania, GLOBE 2500, 2531.
9 2 Thus, James G. Blaine, Robert C. Schenck of Ohio, Green Clay Smith of
Kentucky, a Conservative, Samuel McKee of Kentucky, Boutwell, Rufus P.
Spalding of Ohio, John W. Longyear of Michigan, and Fernando C. Beaman of
Michigan. GLoBE 2460, 2469-73, 2504-05, 2507-10, 2536-37.
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Sir, I want it distinctly understood that the American people
believe that this Government was made for white men and white
women. They do not believe, nor can you make them believe - the
edict of God Almighty is stamped against it -that there is social
equality between the black race and the white.
I have no fault to find with the colored race. . . . I wish them
well, and if I were in a State where they exist in large numbers I
would vote to give them every right enjoyed by the white people
except the right of a negro man to marry a white woman and the
right to vote. But, sir this . . . . [is an] indirect way to inflict
upon the people of the South negro suffrage.
94
Bingham spoke just before some few final remarks by Stevens,
which, in turn, immediately preceded a vote. Bingham said:
The necessity for the first section . . . is one of the lessons that
have been taught . . . by the history of the past four years ....
There . . . remains a want now, in the Constitution . . . which
the proposed amendment will supply. . . . It is the power in the
people . . . to protect by national law the privileges and immuni-
ties of all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn rights of every
person within its jurisdiction whenever the same shall be abridged
or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State.
.... [T]his amendment takes from no State any right that
ever pertained to it. No State ever had the right . . . to deny to
any freeman the equal protection of the laws or to abridge the privi-
leges and immunities of any citizen of the Republic, although many
of them have assumed and exercised the power, and that without
remedy. The amendment does not give, as the second section
shows, the power to Congress of regulating suffrage . ...
... . But, sir, it has been suggested, not here, but elsewhere,
if this section does not confer suffrage the need of it is not per-
ceived. To all such I beg leave again to say, that many instances
of State injustice and oppression have already occurred in the State
legislation of this Union, of flagrant violations of the guarantied
privileges of citizens of the United States, for which the national
Government furnished and could furnish by law no remedy what-
ever. Contrary to the express letter of your Constitution, "cruel and
unusual punishments" have been inflicted under State laws . . .
not only for crimes committed, but for sacred duty done . . ..
... . That great want of the citizen and stranger, protection by
national law from unconstitutional State enactments, is supplied
94 GLoBE 2538.
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by the first section of this amendment. That is the extent that it
hath, no more; and let gentlemen answer to God and their country
who oppose its incorporation into the organic law of the land.95
Bingham went on to discuss section 3, about which he was more
lucid and less enthusiastic.
It was to section 3 that Thaddeus Stevens addressed his closing
remarks. He noted dissension about it, and pleaded for its adop-
tion, to save the Republican party and through it the country.
Unless section 3 was passed Stevens could see "that side of the
House . . . filled with yelling secessionists and hissing copper-
heads." Section 3 was actually "too lenient for my hard heart.
Not only to 187o, but to I807o, every rebel who shed the blood
of loyal men should be prevented from exercising any power in
this Government." Stevens conjured up the scene in the House
before the war when "the men that you propose to admit" through
a milder section 3 occupied the other side, among them "the
mighty Toombs, with his shaggy locks . . . . when weapons were
drawn, and Barksdale's bowie-knife gleamed before our eyes.
Would you have these men back again so soon to reenact those
scenes? Wait until I am gone, I pray you. I want not to go
through it again. It will be but a short time for my colleague to
wait." With these searing words in its ears, the House, though by
a close vote (84-79) in which some Democrats, who sought to
keep the proposal as obnoxious as possible, provided the winning
margin, obeyed Stevens and cut off amendments. (James A. Gar-
field had one changing section 3). By a vote of 128 to 37 the
House then adopted the draft as reported by the Joint Committee.
Lovell Rousseau of Kentucky and a few other Conservatives were
in the opposition."6 This was the afternoon of May io. The final
vote in committee had been had twelve days before.
The proposal was brought up in the Senate on May 23. Before
debate started Charles Sumner made apoint which had also been
raised by a Democrat in the House. The testimony taken before
the Joint Committee, he said, had not been published as a whole,
and no report drawing the Committee's conclusions had been sub-
mitted. He thought it was a "mistake that we are asked to pro-
ceed . . . under such circumstances." Fessenden answered say-
ing there was nothing to be gained by waiting longer.9 7 Debate
95 GLOBE 2542-43.
96 GLOBE 2544-45.
97 GLOBE 2763. The House Democrat who had made a complaint similar to
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itself was opened by Jacob Howard, the Michigan Radical. Fes-
senden, victim of the varioloid, was not feeling well enough to
speak at length. Howard paid due and reasonably loyal attention
to section x, whose inclusion in its present form he had opposed
in committee:
To these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be - for
they are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and
precise nature - to these should be added the personal rights guar-
antied and secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitu-
tion ....
As for the equal protection clause:
This abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with
the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not ap-
plicable to another. It prohibits the hanging of a black man for a
crime for which the white man is not to be hanged. It protects the
black man in his fundamental rights as a citizen with the same
shield which it throws over the white man ...
But, sir, the first section of the proposed amendment does not
give . . . the right of voting. The right of suffrage . . . is merely
the creature of law. It [is] . . . not regarded as one of those fun-
damental rights lying at the basis of all society and without which
a people cannot exist except as slaves .... 98
Speakers wflo followed Howard did not address themselves to
section i, except that Benjamin F. Wade, the Ohio Radical, and
one or two others wondered whether section i should not define
national citizenship. Stewart of Nevada made a last extended plea
Sumner's was Charles A. Eldridge of Wisconsin. GLOBE 2506. A majority report
was submitted by Fessenden in the Senate and Stevens in the House on June 8, and
ordered to be printed. GLOBE 3038, 3051. This was a political document written
by Fessenden, though evidently strongly influenced by Stevens. It did not deal
with § i. Its conclusion stated that "your committee submit it [the fourteenth
amendment] to Congress as the best they could agree upon, in the hope that its
imperfections may be cured, and its deficiencies supplied, by legislative wisdom
.... " See McPHERsoN, op. cit. supra note 28, at 84-93; KENDRiCK, op. cit. supra
note 61, at 32o-26. A minority report, written by Reverdy Johnson and signed as
well by Rogers and Henry Grider, was also submitted, and received and printed
after an unedifying partisan hassle. GLOBE 3275, 3349-50, 3646-49, 3749-50, 3766-
67. This report was rather an imposing paper, arguing for the reinstatement of the
Southern states in their rights of representation in Congress. It made no mention
of § i. See McPHERSON, op. cit. supra note 28, at 93-101.
08 GLOBE 2765, 2766. This speech by Howard, together with a few less explicit
remarks by Bingham, constitutes the principal reliance of those who purport to
find an intention to incorporate the entire Bill of Rights in the fourteenth amend-
ment. See note 13 supra; Fairman, supra note 13, at 65-68, 78-81.
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for the plan he had advocated before the Joint Committee and
elsewhere. 99 Further debate was then postponed. It had so far
gone on for parts of two days. It was not resumed till four days
later, on May 2 9, when Howard, "after consultation with some of
the friends of this measure," presented some amendments which,
"it has been thought . . .will be acceptable to both Houses of
Congress and to the country .. . ." 100 In other words, a Re-
publican caucus had been in session and had straightened out dif-
ferences among the Republicans, which, as debate had revealed,
centered around section 3. It was agreed to forego disenfranchis-
ing Southern whites. Instead a provision was inserted disqualify-
ing certain Southerners for federal office; section 2, though modi-
fied, remained essentially the same; and United States citizenship
was defined in section i. Thus the amendment assumed its pres-
ent form. The proceedings of the caucus were, as Thomas A.
Hendricks, Democrat of Indiana, charged, so secret that "no out-
side Senators, not even the sharp-eyed men of the press, have been
able to learn one word that was spoken, or one vote given." 101
They have remained secret to this day.
The Senate now engaged in a debate which lasted for several
days. But, as had been the case in the House and earlier in the
Senate itself, proportionately little was said about section x by
either Democrats'or Republicans. It was charged that the section
gave citizenship to "savage" Indians and Gypsies and that it em-
bodied the Civil Rights Act.102 Luke Poland, Republican from
Vermont and a former Chief Justice of that state, drew attention
to state laws, "some of them of very recent enactment," at which
the Civil Rights Act had struck. This amendment, he implied,
was also directed at the Black Codes. 10 3 The same implication
was left with the Senate by John B. Henderson of Missouri, a Re-
publican who enjoyed much respect, and who was no doctrinaire
Radical. It would be "a loss of time," he said, "to discuss the re-
maining provisions of the section [other than the citizenship
clause, which he held to be simply declaratory of existing law],
for they merely secure the rights that attach to citizenship in all
free Governments." Nevertheless, Henderson did mention the
Black Codes, which formed a "system of oppression" rendering
99 GLOBE 2768-69, 2798-803; see note 78 supra.
100 GLOBE 2869.
101 GLOBE 2939; see KENDRicK, op. cit. supra note 6i, at 316.
102 GLOBE 2896, 2939, 2891-93.
103 GLOBE 2961.
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the Negro a "degraded outcast" deprived of the "commonest
rights of human nature," the right to hold property, to sue, to con-
front witnesses, to have the process of the courts. The Freed-
men's Bureau and Civil Rights Bills and, Henderson implied,
section i of this amendment, were all intended to cure this
situation.104 Timothy 0. Howe of Wisconsin, a Radical, spoke in
the same vein, but in richer detail. Negroes, he said, had been
denied elementary rights:
The right to hold land . . . the right to collect their wages by the
processes of the law . . . the right to appear in the courts as suitors
. . . the right to give testimony ....
... . [B]ut, sir, these are not the only rights that can be denied
. ... I have taken considerable pains to look over the actual legis-
lation [in the South] . . . . I read not long since a statute enacted
by the Legislature of Florida for the education of her colored peo-
ple. . . . They make provision for the education of their white
children also, and everybody who has any property there is taxed
for the education of the white children. Black and white are taxed
alike for that purpose; but for the education of colored children a
fund is raised only from colored men.
Howe described the colored school system in Florida, which was,
of course, segregated, without pointing out that fact; what he
stressed was the inadequacy of the poorly supported colored
schools. He implied that section i would render this legislation
illegal, but he gave no indication that he believed its vice to lie in
segregation. 10 5
Aside from a parting shot by Reverdy Johnson, nothing else
was said in the Senate about section i, and it is perhaps note-
worthy that conservative Republicans like Cowan and Doolittle,
Democrats like Johnson, and even Democrats of the stripe of
Garrett Davis of Kentucky spoke at some length, but refrained
from raising alarms concerning the reach of section i and the sort
of local practices it would outlaw. 00 This contrasts with Senate
and House debates on the Civil Rights Act, and with Rogers' and
even some of his colleagues' more recent statements in the House.
104 GLOBE 3031, 3034-35.
105 GLOBE, App. 219. The Florida statute which Howe must have had in mind
is the Act of January 16, i866, Fla. Laws 1865, c. 1475. It is printed in part in i
FLEZMGnO, DOcumENTARY HISTORY OT RECONSTRUCTION 277-79 (19o6).
106 GLOBE 2896, 2939, 2891-93; GLOBE, App. 240. The same may be said of
McDougall of California, also a Democrat, though not of the utterly unreconstructi-
ble Davis type. GLOBE 3030-31.
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But the absence of purported alarm must be understood in the
light of the paucity of attention generally devoted to section i,
which in turn is doubtless attributable to the evident greater
political vulnerability of the Republicans with respect to other
sections of the amendment. Just before the vote, Reverdy John-
son, who had spoken at length on the basis of representation,
0 7
remarked that while he saw no objection to the due process clause,
he simply did not understand what would be the effect of the
privileges and immunities clause, and wished it might be deleted.
No one made a closing speech for the proponents. The vote
followed immediately. It was 33 to ii; the date, June 8. Four
Republicans - Cowan, Doolittle, Norton of Minnesota, and Van
Winkle of West Virginia, the hard core of Conservatives- voted
nay. 0
8
On June 13 the House, under a fifteen-minute rule, took up the
amendment as returned from the Senate.'0 9 Rogers spoke first.
The burden of his remarks was a complaint that the amendment
had been ill-considered by a Congress cringing under the party
whip. He referred in passing to section i, repeating that it "simply
embodied the gist of the civil rights bill." His heavy artillery was
concentrated on the manner in which the amendment had been
pushed through the Senate by command of the secret Radical
caucus." 0 A few others spoke without mentioning section i.
Then Thaddeus Stevens moved the previous question, thus bring-
ing on the vote. But first he had a few words to say, which are
worth quoting extensively, both for their characteristic bite and
because they were the launching words, the last spoken before the
fourteenth amendment slid down the ways. The implacable old
man was not happy:
In my youth, in my manhood, in my old age, I had fondly
dreamed that when any fortunate chance should have broken up
for awhile the foundation of our institutions, and released us from
obligations the most tyrannical that ever man imposed in the name
of freedom, that the intelligent, pure and just men of this Republic,
true to their professions and their consciences, would have so re-
modeled all our institutions as to have freed them from every ves-
tige of human oppression, of inequality of rights, of the recognized
107 GLOBE 3026-30.
10' GLOBE 3041-42.
109 GL OBE 3144.
110 GLOBE, App. 229.
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degradation of the poor, and the superior caste of the rich. In short,
that no distinction would be tolerated in this purified Republic but
what arose from merit and conduct. This bright dream has van-
ished "like the baseless fabric of a vision." I find that we shall be
obliged to be content with patching up the worst portions of the
ancient edifice, and leaving it, in many of its parts, to be swept
through by the tempests, the frosts, and the storms of despotism.
Do you inquire why, holding these views and possessing some
will of my own, I accept so imperfect a proposition? I answer,
because I live among men and not among angels ....
Perhaps more strenuous effort might have resulted in a better
plan. But Congress had had to face the hostility of the President,
and this proposal met in some measure the danger of "tyranny"
emanating from the White House, "the danger arising from the
unscrupulous use of patronage and from the oily orations of false
prophets, famous for sixty-day obligations and for protested po-
litical promises . . . ." Stevens lightly reviewed some of the
changes made in the Senate. The principal one was, of course,
section 3, and he disapproved. He ended by urging speedy adop-
tion of the imperfect product. "I dread delay," he said. Then:
The danger is that before any constitutional guards shall have been
adopted Congress will be flooded by rebels and rebel sympa-
thizers. . . . Whoever has watched the feelings of this House dur-
ing the tedious months of this session, listened to the impatient
whispering of some and the open declarations of others; especially
when able and sincere men propose to gratify personal predilections
by breaking the ranks of the Union forces and presenting to the
enemy a ragged front of stragglers, must be anxious to hasten the
result and prevent the demoralization of our friends. Hence, I say,
let us no longer delay; take what we can get now, and hope for
better things in further legislation; in enabling acts or other provi-
sions.
I now, sir, ask for the question.
The vote which followed immediately and which sent the four-
teenth amendment to the country was 120 yeas, 32 nays. There
were no Republican votes against. Rousseau of Kentucky and a
few other Conservatives were recorded absent. Eldridge, the
Democrat, said: "I desire to state that if Messrs. Brooks and
Voorhees had not been expelled, they would have voted against
this proposition. [Great laughter.]" And Schenck, of the Radical
leadership, retorted: "And I desire to say that if Jeff. Davis were
19551
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here, he would probably also have voted the same way. [Renewed
laughter.]" 111
Summary and Conclusions
As we have seen, the first approach made by the 3 9 th Congress
toward dealing with racial discrimination turned on the "civil
rights" formula. The Senate Moderates, led by Trumbull and
Fessenden, who sponsored this formula, assigned a limited and
well-defined meaning to it. In their view it covered the right to
contract, sue, give evidence in court, and inherit, hold, and dispose
of real and personal property; also a right to equal protection in
the literal sense of benefiting equally from laws for the security
of person and property, including presumably laws permitting
ownership of firearms, and to equality in the penalties and burdens
provided by law. Certainly able men such as Trumbull and Fes-
senden realized that each of the seemingly well-bounded rights
'they enumerated carried about it, like an upper atmosphere, an
area in which its force was uncertain. Thus it is clear that the
Moderates wished also to protect rights of free movement, and a
right to engage in occupations of one's choice. They doubtless
considered that their enumeration somehow accomplished this
purpose. Similarly, the Moderates often argued that one of the
imperative needs of the time was to educate, to "elevate," to
"Christianize" the Negro; indeed, this was almost universally-
held doctrine, from which even Conservatives like Cowan and
Democrats like Rogers did not dissent. Hence one may surmise
that the Moderates believed they were guaranteeing a right to
equal benefits from state educational systems supported by gen-
eral tax funds. But there is no evidence whatever showing that
for its sponsors the civil rights formula had anything to do with
unsegregated public schools; Wilson, its sponsor in the House,
specifically disclaimed any such notion. Similarly, it is plain that
the Moderates did not intend to confer any right of intermarriage,
the right to sit on juries, or the right to vote.
Civil rights protection was first extended by the Freedmen's
Bureau Bill. This was not a closely debated measure, because
it was limited in duration and territorial applicability. The Con-
servative votes cast in its favor mark it as a sacrificial offering on
the altar of Radicalism, not seriously considered on its own merits.
SGLOBE 3148-49.
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When the same formula was next brought forth in the Civil Rights
Bill, it evoked warnings from the Democratic and Conservative
opposition in the Senate, which argued that the phrase "civil
rights" might well be construed to include more rights than its
sponsors intended to affect. One of the warnings related to segre-
gation. The Moderates were unmoved, and the bill was carried
in the Senate.
The Joint Committee in the meantime was dealing with the
same problem. It elected not to use the civil rights formula and
offered instead, in the Bingham amendment, equal protection "in
the rights of life, liberty and property," plus a privileges and im-
munities clause. Given the evils represented by the Black Codes,
which were foremost in the minds of all men, it must be supposed
that this language was deemed to protect all the rights specifically
enumerated in the Civil Rights Bill. But it is difficult to interpret
the deliberate choice against using the term "civil rights" as any-
thing but a rejection of what were deemed its wider implications.
The Bingham amendment did not act directly on the states. It
was an unconditional grant of power to Congress, like the older
grants of legislative power; and like them it was bolstered by a
necessary and proper clause. This feature made it unacceptable
to Moderates like Hale. The fact that the amendment itself gave
no assurance of permanent protection cost the support of some
Radicals. On these grounds the proposal went down to defeat.
There were some questions raised also concerning the kind of
rights covered, and Bingham rather clumsily responded by sug-
gesting the Moderate position on the Civil Rights Bill, but this
was completely secondary. Only Rogers, a partisan given to ex-
treme accusations, spoke of this proposal as if there had been no
difference between it and a "civil rights" guaranty.
The Civil Rights Bill itself, as brought from the Senate to the
House, split the alliance of various shades of Moderates and Rad-
icals which constituted the Republican majority. The bill was
presented to the House as a measure of limited objectives, follow-
ing Trumbull's views. But a substantial number of Republicans
were troubled by the issue of constitutionality. Others were un-
easy on policy grounds about the reach of section i, but inclined
to believe that the bill could be rendered constitutional by amend-
ment, and, in any event, out of mixed motives at which one can
only guess, conquered their apprehensions and voted for it in the
end. Bingham, whose position was in this instance entirely self-
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consistent, thought the bill incurably unconstitutional, its enforce-
ment provisions monstrous, and the civil rights guaranty of very
broad application and unwise. The concession these Republicans
wrung from the leadership was the elimination of the civil rights
formula and thus the avoidance of possible "latitudinarian" con-
struction. The Moderate position that the bill dealt only with a
distinct and limited set of rights was conclusively validated.
Against this backdrop, the joint Committee on Reconstruction
began framing the fourteenth amendment. In drafting section i,
it vacillated between the civil rights formula and language pro-
posed by Bingham, finally adopting the latter. Stevens' speech
opening debate on the amendment in the House presented section
i in terms quite similar to the Moderate position on the Civil
Rights Bill, though there was a rather notable absence of the dis-
claimers of wider coverage which usually accompanied the Mod-
erates' statements of objectives. A few remarks made in the Sen-
ate sounded in the same vein. For the rest, however, section i was
not really debated. Rogers, whose remarks are always subject to
heavy discount, considering his shaky position in the affections of
his own party colleagues, raised "latitudinarian" alarms. One or
two other Democrats in the House did so also. But more and
more, debate turned on section 3 and not much else. The focus
of attention is well indicated by Stevens' brief address immediately
before the first vote in the House. In this atmosphere, section i
became the subject of a stock generalization: it was dismissed as
embodying and, in one sense for the Republicans, in another for
the Democrats and Conservatives, "constitutionalizing" the Civil
Rights Act.
The obvious conclusion to which the evidence, thus summa-
rized, easily leads is that section i of the fourteenth amendment,
like section i of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, carried out the rela-
tively narrow objectives of the Moderates, and hence, as originally
understood, was meant to apply neither to jury service, nor suf-
frage, nor antimiscegenation statutes, nor segregation. This con-
clusion is supported by the blunt expression of disappointment to
which Thaddeus Stevens gave vent in the House. Nothing in the
election campaign of 1866 or in the ratification proceedings nega-
tives it. Section i received in both about the attention it had re-
ceived in Congress, and in about the same terms. 11 2 One or two
'12 On the issues of the campaign of i866, see BEALE, THE CRITICAL YEAR
(930); with specific reference to § I of the fourteenth amendment, see Fairman,
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"reconstructed" Southern legislatures took what turned out, of
course, to be temporary measures to abolish segregation. 1 3 There
is little if any indication of an impression prevailing elsewhere
that the amendment required such action.
If the fourteenth amendment were a statute, a court might very
well hold, on the basis of what has been said so far, that it was
foreclosed from applying it to segregation in public schools. The
evidence of congressional purpose is as clear as such evidence is
likely to be, and no language barrier stands in the way of con-
struing the section in conformity with it. But we are dealing with
a constitutional amendment, not a statute. The tradition of a
broadly worded organic law not frequently or lightly amended
was well-established by 1866, and, despite the somewhat revolu-
tionary fervor with which the Radicals were pressing their
changes, it cannot be assumed that they or anyone else expected
or wished the future role of the Constitution in the scheme of
American government to differ from the past. Should not the
search for congressional purpose, therefore, properly be twofold?
One inquiry should be directed at the congressional understand-
ing of the immediate effect of the enactment on conditions then
present. Another should aim to discover what if any thought was
given to the long-range effect, under future circumstances, of pro-
visions necessarily intended for permanence.
That the Court saw the need for two such inquiries with respect
to the original understanding on segregation is clearly indicated
by the questions it propounded at the 1952 Term."4 The Court
asked first whether Congress and the state legislatures contem-
plated that the fourteenth amendment would abolish segregation
in public schools. It next asked whether, assuming that the imme-
diate abolition of segregation was not contemplated, the framers
nevertheless understood that Congress acting .under section 5, or
the Court in the exercise of the judicial function would, in light
of future conditions, have power to abolish segregation.
With this double aspect of the inquiry in mind, certain other
supra note x3, at 69-78. For a survey of ratification materials, see id. at 84-126.
The state materials are most thoroughly reviewed in the appendix to the Govern-
ment's brief as amicus in the Segregation Cases. Appendix to the Supplemental
Brief for the United States on Reargument, Nos. i, 2, 4, 8, io, at 160-393, Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13 LA. CONST. art. 135 (i868); cf. LA. CoNsT. art. 224 (i879); LA. CoNsr. art.
248 (i898). S.C. CoNsT. art. X (i868) (semble) ; cf. S.C. CONST. art. XI (1895).
114 See note 16 supra.
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features of the legislative history - not inconsistent with the con-
clusion earlier stated, but complementary to it -became signifi-
cant. Thus, section i of the fourteenth amendment, on its face,
deals not only with racial discrimination, but also with discrimi-
nation whether or not based on color. This cannot have been acci-
dental, since the alternative considered by the Joint Committee,
the civil rights formula, did apply only to racial discrimination.
Everyone's immediate preoccupation in the 3 9th Congress - in-
sofar as it did not go to partisan questions - was, of course, with
hardships being visited on the colored race. Yet the fact that the
proposed constitutional amendment was couched in more general
terms could not have escaped those who voted for it. And this
feature of it could not have been deemed to be included in the
standard identification of section i with the Civil Rights Act.
Again, when it rejected the civil rights formula in reporting out
the abortive Bingham amendment, the Joint Committee elected to
submit an equal protection clause limited to the rights of life, lib-
erty, and property, supplemented by a necessary and proper clause.
Now the choice was in favor of a due process clause limited the
way the equal protection clause had been in the earlier draft, but
of an equal protection clause not so limited: equal protection "of
the laws." Presumably the lesson taught by the defeat of the
Bingham amendment had been learned. Congress was not to have
unlimited discretion, and it was not to have the leeway repre-
sented by "necessary and proper" power. 1C5 One would have to
assume a lack of familiarity with the English language to con-
clude that a further difference between the Bingham amendment
and the new proposal was not also perceived, namely, the differ-
ence between equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and
property, a phrase which so aptly evoked the evils uppermost in
men's minds at the time, and equal protection of the laws, a clause
115 In 1871, in the course of the debate on the Act of April 2o, 1871 (Ku Klux
Act), c. 22, i7 STAT. 13, Bingham argued the contrary. He contended that Con-
gress had no less power to legislate under the fourteenth amendment than it would
have had under his own earlier, rejected proposal. In other words, he attached
no significance whatever to the defeat of that proposal. That is, of course, a
rather arbitrary way to deal with the materials. As James A. Garfield had occasion
to tell Bingham, "my colleague can make but he cannot unmake history." CONG.
GLOBE, APP., 42d Cong., ist Sess. 83-86, 113-17, 15i (1871); see Fairman, supra
note 13, at 136-37; FLAcK,, op. cit. supra note 54, at 226-49. Bingham's view
evidently prevailed in Congress, but the Supreme Court, without reference to the
legislative history and dealing simply with the language of the fourteenth amend-
ment on its face, saw it otherwise. United States v. Harris, 1o6 U.S. 629 (1883).
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which is plainly capable of being applied to all subjects of state
legislation. Could the comparison have failed to leave the implica-
tion that the new phrase, while it did not necessarily, and cer-
tainly not expressly, carry greater coverage than the old, was
nevertheless roomier, more receptive to "latitudinarian" construc-
tion? No one made the point with regard to this particular clause.
But in opening debate in the Senate, Jacob Howard was frank to
say that only the future could tell just what application the privi-
leges and immunities provision might have. And before the vote in
the Senate, Reverdy Johnson, a Democrat, to be sure, but a re-
spected constitutional lawyer and no rabid partisan, confessed his
puzzlement about the same clause. Finally, it is noteworthy that
the shorthand argument characterizing the fourteenth amendment
as the constitutional embodiment of the Civil Rights Act was often
accompanied on the Republican side by generalities about the self-
evident demands of justice and the natural rights of man. This
was true both in Congress and in the course of the election which
followed."' To all this should be added the fact that while the
Joint Committee's rejection of the civil rights formula is quite
manifest, there is implicit also in its choice of language a rejec-
tion- presumably as inappropriate in a constitutional provision
- of such a specific and exclusive enumeration of rights as ap-
peared in section i of the Civil Rights Act.
These bits and pieces of additional evidence do not contradict
and could not in any event override the direct proof showing the
specific evils at which the great body of congressional opinion
thought it was striking. But perhaps they provide sufficient basis
for the formulation of an additional hypothesis. It remains true
that an explicit provision going further than the Civil Rights Act
could not have been carried in the 39 th Congress; also that a
plenary grant of legislative power such as the Bingham amend-
ment would not have mustered the necessary majority. But may
it not be that the Moderates and the Radicals reached a com-
promise permitting them to go to the country with language
which they could, where necessary, defend against damaging
alarms raised by the opposition, but which at the same time was
sufficiently elastic to permit reasonable future advances? This is
thoroughly consistent with rejection of the civil rights formula
and its implications. That formula could not serve the purpose of
116 See note 112 sUpra.
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such a compromise. It had been under heavy attack at this ses-
sion, and among those who had expressed fears concerning its
reach were Republicans who would have to go forth and stand
on the platform of the fourteenth amendment. Bingham, of
course, was one of these men, and he could not be required to go
on the hustings and risk being made to eat his own words. If the
party was to unite behind a compromise which consisted neither
of an exclusive listing of a limited series of rights, nor of a formu-
lation dangerously vulnerable to attacks pandering to the preju-
dices of the people, new language had to be found. Bingham him-
self supplied it. It had both sweep and the appearance of a careful
enumeration of rights, and it had a ring to echo in the national
memory of libertarian beginnings. To put it another way, the
Moderates, with a bit of timely assistance from Fessenden's vari-
oloid, consolidated the victory they had achieved in the Civil
Rights Act debate. They could go forth and honestly defend
themselves against charges that on the day after ratification Ne-
groes were going to become white men's "social equals," marry
their daughters, vote in their elections, sit on their juries, and at-
tend schools with their children. The Radicals (though they had
to compromise once more on section 3) obtained what early in the
session had seemed a very uncertain prize indeed: a firm alliance,
under Radical leadership, with the Moderates in the struggle
against the President, and thus a good, clear chance at increasing
and prolonging their political power. In the future, the Radicals
could, in one way or another, put through such further civil rights
provisions as they thought the country would take, without being
subject to the sort of effective constitutional objections which
haunted them when they were forced to operate under the thir-
teenth amendment.
It is, of course, giving the men of the 3 9 th Congress much more
than their due to ennoble them by a comparison of their proceed-
ings with the deliberations of the Philadelphia Convention. Yet if
this was the compromise that was struck, then these men emu-
lated the technique of the original framers, who were also respon-
sible to an electorate only partly receptive to the fullness of their
principles, and who similarly avoided the explicit grant of some
powers without foreclosing their future assumption.1'7 Whatever
other support this hypothesis may have, it has behind it the very
authoritative voice of Thaddeus Stevens, who held it, and twice
11"7 See Thayer, supra note 14, at 75-78, and especially at 78 n.2.
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gave notice of it in speaking on the fourteenth amendment. It was
Stevens who dutifully defined section i more or less in the narrow
terms a Trumbull or a Fessenden would have used; it fell short
of his wishes. And it was Stevens, his hopes fulfilled, who power-
fully and candidly emphasized the political opportunities which
the amendment gained for the Radicals, and who looked to the
future for better things "in further legislation, in enabling acts or
other provisions." Similarly, when it at last emerged, though too
late to influence debate, the report of the Joint Committee
submitted the amendment "in the hope that its imperfections
may be cured and its deficiencies supplied, by legislative wis-
dom ... , 118 It need hardly be added that in view of Stevens'
remarks, and in view also of the nature of the other evidence
which supports it, this hypothesis cannot be disparaged as putting
forth an undisclosed, conspiratorial purpose such as has been im-
puted to Bingham and others with regard to protection of corpo-
rations.'" Indeed, no specific purpose going beyond the coverage
of the Civil Rights Act is suggested; rather an awareness on the
part of these framers that it was a constitution they were writing,
which led to a choice of language capable of growth.
It is such a reading as this of the original understanding, in re-
sponse to the second of the questions propounded by the Court,
that the Chief Justice must have had in mind when he termed the
materials "inconclusive." For up to this point they tell a clear
story and are anything but inconclusive. From this point on the
word is apt, since the interpretation of the evidence just set out
comes only to this, that the question of giving greater protection
than was extended by the Civil Rights Act was deferred, was left
open, to be decided another day under a constitutional provision
with more scope than the unserviceable thirteenth amendment.
Some no doubt felt more certain than others that the new amend-
ment would make possible further strides toward the ideal of
equality. That remained to be decided, and there is no indication
of the way in which anyone thought the decision would go on any
given specific issue. 2 0 It depended a good deal on the trend in
28 See note 97 supra.
119 See note 13 supra.
2
2 0 Much has been made of the abolitionist antecedents of a number of men
prominent in the 39th Congress, among them Stevens, and-a little more
dubiously -Bingham. And it has been contended that terms similar to those used
by Bingham in § i of the fourteenth amendment had been widely advertised
abolitionist cliches, which were well understood by the country as embodying the
1955]
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public opinion. Actually, one of the things the Radicals had con-
tended for throughout the session, and doubtless considered that
they gained by the final compromise, was time and the chance to
educate the public. Such expectations as the Radicals had were
centered quite clearly on legislative action. At least this holds
true for Stevens. These men were aware of the power the Court
could exercise. They were for the most part bitterly aware of it,
having long fought such decisions as the Dred Scott case. Most
probably they had little hope that the Court would play a role
in furthering their long-range objectives. But the relevant point
is that the Radical leadership succeeded in obtaining a provi-
sion whose future effect was left to future determination. The
fact that they themselves expected such a future determination
to be made in Congress is not controlling. It merely reflects
their estimate that men of their view were more likely to prevail
in the legislature than in other branches of the government. It
indicates no judgment about the powers and functions properly to
be exercised by the other branches.
Had the Court in the Segregation Cases stopped short of the
inconclusive answer to the second of its questions handed down at
the previous term, it would have been faced with one of two un-
fortunate choices. It could have deemed itself bound by the legis-
lative history showing the immediate objectives to which section i
of the fourteenth amendment was addressed, and rather clearly
demonstrating that it was not expected in i866 to apply to segre-
gation. The Court would in that event also have repudiated much
of the provision's "line of growth." For it is as clear that section i
was not deemed in i866 to deal with jury service and other matters
"implicit in . . . ordered liberty" 121 to which the Court has since
fullness of the abolitionist doctrine. See TENBROEx, TnE ANTSLAVERY OaiGoxs OF
THE FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT (ig5i); Graham, The Early Antislavery Back-
grounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, ig5o Wis. L. REv. 479, 61o. Yet even
among the abolitionists there were differences of view concerning the extent to
which uncompromising egalitarian principles should be applied -suddenly and
indiscriminately - to the Negro. See NYE, FETTERED FREEDo M: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND
THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 1830-x860 (1949). And it is always dangerous to assume
that men- especially men of a revolutionary persuasion - who have achieved
power act on principles they espoused while in violent opposition. Be that as it
may, the abolitionist past of some Radicals can, in view of all the evidence, be
relevant to only one facet of the compromise they accepted; it helps to indicate
not what they believed they were achieving immediately, but what they hoped
was open to future achievement.
:121 Justice Cardozo in P lko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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applied it.12 2 Secondly, the Court could have faced the embarrass-
ment of going counter to what it took to be the original under-
standing, and of formulating, as it has not often needed to do in
the past, an explicit theory rationalizing such a course. The Court,
of course, made neither choice. It was able to avoid the dilemma
because the record of history, properly understood, left the way
open to, in fact invited, a decision based on the moral and material
state of the nation in 1954 , not i866.
122 E.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, ioo U.S. 303 (i88o); Norris v. Alabama,
294 U.S. 587 (1935) (jury service). The Court has also, in the changed circum-
stances created by the fifteenth amendment, applied the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth to the right to vote. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) ; cf.
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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